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NOTES
Civil Procedure-Trial Court Discretion in Rule 54(b) Certifica-
tion: Extension of the Panichella Requirement of an Infrequent,
Harsh Case
Under the common law the jurisdiction of an appellate court was
based on the final disposition of the entire action by the lower court
from which the appeal was taken.1 Among the many devices2 that have
been used to circumvent this general rule of finality is Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b).3 The purpose of this rule was to avoid problems
possibly developed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by the
new opportunities for liberal joinder of claims in multiple claims ac-
tions.4 By allowing judgment to be entered on fewer than all of the
claims in a multiple claims action, rule 54(b) solves the dilemma of delay
in entry of judgment on one claim while adjudication is pending on an
unrelated claim that is part of the same action.' This rule has evolved to
operate in such a manner that entry of judgment under the rule is now
granted at -the discretion of the trial court.6 This evolution has created
the interrelated problems of determining within what bounds the trial
1. Holcombe v. McKusick, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 552, 554-55 (1857); United States
v. Girault, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 21, 31-32 (1850).
2. Other methods of appeal that do not require common-law finality as a
condition include 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292 & 1651 (1970).
3. Rule 54(b) presently reads:
Judgment upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express .deter-
mination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction
for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
4. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432 (1956). Among these
rules are FED. R. Crv. P. 13, 14, 18 & 20.
5. 351 U.S. at 432-33; FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Notes of Advisory Comm. on 1946
Amendment.
6. See text accompanying notes 19-31 infra.
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court may grant 54(b) certification and by what standards the appellate
court may police the exercise of this discretion. t Both of these considera-
tions were highlighted by Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric
Co.," a decision in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals added a
new limitation to the district court's power to grant 54(b) certification."
In Allis-Chalmers, the trial court granted summary judgment on
the original claim for the price of goods purchased by Philadelphia
Electric Company (PECO) from Allis-Chalmers Corporation (A-C).
Despite a pending counterclaim for damages based on a dispute con-
cerning defective goods A-C had previously sold to PECO,' 0 54(b)
certification was granted on the original claim so that A-C could execute
that judgment.11 The appellate court found, however, that the trial
court abused its discretion in this certification.' 2 The Third Circuit
established the rule that abuse of discretion exists when the district court
gives no clear articulation of the reasons for the 54(b) certification.' 3
While the court of appeals recognized that the district court had given its
reason for the certification by finding that there was no factual integra-
tion of the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims, it considered the
7. Cf. text accompanying notes 32-42 infra. The district court has the discretion
not to certify that which would otherwise be appealable. See B.B. Adams Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. Department of HUD, 501 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
8. 521 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1975).
9. Although in this opinion there is found the initial requirement that the district
court articulate the reasons for 54(b) certification, 521 F.2d at 364-65; see note 13 and
accompanying text infra, the unprecedented holding is that there is always a presumption
against certification when there exists a pending claim that may be set off against the
adjudicated claims. 521 F.2d at 366; cf. notes 38 & 39 and accompanying text infra.
10. The counterclaim was based on the allegation that a switch gear manufactured
by A-C for PECO malfunctioned due to the improper construction of circuit breakers.
The major dispute, however, centered on conflicting warranty provisions in the contract
form submitted by A-C and a subsequent purchase order form submitted by PECO. The
timing of confirmation of the contract and the applicable warranties were among the
controverted issues. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim at
2-6; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim
at 1-4.
11. Summary judgment was also entered on a claim for repair services by A-C for
PECO. These services were also unrelated to the counterclaim. Allis-Chalmers Corp.
v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 64 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
12. 521 F.2d at 367. In a subsequent proceeding the trial court reinstated the
54(b) certification. See note 59 infra. There was no appeal of the new entry of
judgment since the claims were settled one week after the order for 54(b) certification
was reinstated. See note 58 infra.
13. 521 F.2d at 364. It has, however, been twice suggested that the district court
in granting 54(b) certification should facilitate better review of the proper exercise of
discretion by giving a "brief reasoned statement in support of its determination." Gumer
v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 516 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1974); Schwartz v. Compagnie
Gen. Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 1968).
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factual relationship between the claims to be only "one factor to be
considered." 14  By determining that this factor alone was insufficient
for entry of judgment because of the existence of the counterclaim that
might allow PECO to recover all it owed A-C, the Third Circuit placed
a new restriction on the district court's power to grant 54(b) certifica-
tion.15 A possibility of set-off required the party seeking certification to
have proved economic or equitable harm by delay. The failure of the
district court to consider those factors resulted in inadequate proof of
the infrequent, harsh case"' that some courts have required for the
proper exercise of discretion in 54(b) certification.1 7
The Allis-Chalmers decision is the product of a rule that has devel-
oped from a problem-plagued statutory and case history. Rule 54(b)
was designed to solve the problem of delay in the termination of parts of
the new multiple claims actions, which were permitted by the liberal
rules of joinder.'" As originally written, the rule directed that a determi-
nation of all issues material to one of the multiple claims would allow that
claim to be treated as final and appealable.' 9 An order determining all
such issues not only allowed appeal without delay; it also caused the
time for appeal to run with regard to the settled claim."0 Problems
14. 521 F.2d at 365.
15. The court decided that a possibility of set-off "weighs heavily against the grant
of 54(b) certification." Id. at 366. The court recognized that this case was distinguish-
able from previous set-off situations in that it involved permissible rather than compulso-
ry counterclaims. But it viewed the undesirability of an award that might later be
reimbursed to be the dominant factor. Id. But see cases cited notes 38 & 39 infra.
16. 521 F.2d at 366. For a discussion of the development of the requirement of
the infrequent, harsh case for 54(b) certification, see notes 43-53 and accompanying text
infra.
17. See cases cited note 43 infra.
18. See authorities cited note 4 supra.
19. Rule 54(b) as promulgated in 1939 read as follows:
Judgment at Various Stages. When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, the court at any stage, upon a determination of the
issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may enter
a judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action
with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to
the remaining claims ...
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 433 (1956). The circularity in the
rule's requirement of a "judgment disposing of [a] claim" may be one of the problems in
determining what was final. This problem is demonstrated by the definition of "judg-
ment" in rule 54(a). "'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order
from which an appeal lies." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(a). It seems clear, however, that the
problems in determining what is final are many. Cf. cases cited note 41 infra; Crick,
The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE LJ. 539 (1932).
20. E.g., Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950); Reeves
v, Beardall, 316 U.S. 283 (1942).
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arose because of the difficulty of the concept of determination of all
material issues.2 Counsel who erroneously believed that an order did
not resolve all issues with regard to one claim would not appeal until
completion of the entire action, only to find that the statute of limita-
tions barred the appeal as to the previously terminated claim.22 The
natural development of such a possibility was that the careful attorney
would appeal many orders that did not completely dispose of a claim for
fear that the time for appeal would run. With the appellate courts
being bombarded with unnecessary, but properly cautious appeals, the
first of two amendments23 to rule 54(b) was adopted. To protect
parties against loss of appellate rights, the amended rule provided that
the district court "may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or
more but less than all of the claims only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for
the entry of judgment. 24 While the signal created by 54(b) certifica-
tion gave clear notice of the termination of part of an action,2" the new
rule created additional questions about the undefined limits of the new
powers that had been placed with the district court.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey26 the United States Supreme
Court dealt with two issues created by the new rule: (1) whether the
rule delegated an irrevocable power of certification to the district court,2 7
21. See C. WaiGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcCE & PROCEDURE § 2653 (1973).
22. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 434 (1956).
23. The second amendment in 1961 is not relevant here. That amendment
expanded rule 54(b) explicitly to allow certification in cases involving multiple parties
and one or more claims. See note 3 supra.
24. 351 U.S. at 434-35 (emphasis omitted).
25. Id.
26. 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
27. Although the Supreme Court's resolution of this issue seemed to assume the
answer, id. at 436, there was considerable disagreement prior to the Sears decision. Some
circuits felt that 54(b) certification could properly be granted only if the claim were
separate and distinct (i.e., met the previous standards of finality). Gold Seal Co. v.
Weeks, 209 F.2d 802, 810-11 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Flegenheimer v. General Mills, Inc., 191
F.2d 237, 241 (2d Cir. 1951) (Learned Hand saying that "nowhere in [amended rule
54(b)] can be found a suggestion that the [trial] judge can make that 'final' which was
not 'final' before."). Others felt that the only limitation on the discretion of the trial
court was that the judgment be entered on a claim, at which point the 54(b) certification
was conclusive of appellate jurisdiction. Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267,
269-70 (3d Cir. 1952); Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 191 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir.
1951) (the Flegenheimer opinion indicates that there was disagreement within the
Second Circuit). The Bendix Aviation court found the fact that the trial court "may
direct the entry of a final judgment" (emphasis added) to be persuasive evidence that
amended rule 54(b) granted almost complete discretion to that court. Judge Hand in
Flegenheimer was, however, convinced that the rule was one of limitation because of the
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and (2) whether the rule modified the prior standard of finality re-
quired for the district court's discretionary certification. The Court
established that the district court's power of certification is not absolute
and that the appellate court should dismiss an appeal pursuant to rule
54(b) if it finds "(1) that the judgment... was not a decision upon
a 'claim for relief,' (2) that the decision was not . . . an ultimate
disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple
claims action, or (3) that the District Court abused its discretion in
certifying the order."28  With regard to the standard of finality under
the amended rule, the Court held that the amended rule did "not relax
the [28 U.S.C. section 1291] finality required of each decision."29 It did,
however, recognize that a final order on a claim could be entered under
the amended rule although it would not have been appealable under
the original rule. Application of this modification was permissible
only "[i]f the District Court certifies a final order... and the Court
of Appeals is satisfied that there has been no abuse of discretion."30 The
Supreme Court thus delegated to the district courts and courts of appeal
the power of determining the specific fact situations that qualify for
54(b) certification.31
The guidelines for this determination, however, had been fixed by
the Supreme Court in its recommendation that, to determine whether
54(b) certification should be granted, the inconvenience and costs of
piecemeal review should be balanced against the danger of denying
requirement of a "final judgment." Because of the circular definition of "final judgment"
in rule 54(a), see note 19 supra, this reasoning does not appear sound. Judge Hand's
understanding of the function of the rule in the judicial system is, however, demonstrated
by the ability of the trial court to distort the function of the rule. Zangardi v. Tobriner,
330 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
28. 351 U.S. at 436. The diminution of the trial judge's discretion was argued to
be a poor decision for several reasons, including (1) the litigants will have to bear the
expense of preparing their briefs and arguments with little or no idea that the court of
appeals will hear their claim, Note, Separate Review of Claims in Multiple Claims Suits:
Appellate lurisdiction Under Amended Rule 54(b), 62 YALE LJ. 263 (1953), and (2)
since the district court judge is in the best position to understand the fairness to the
parties, discretion, although open to abuse, is best delegated to that authority. Bendix
Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1952); cf. Note, Federal
Procedure-udgment on Less Than All Multiple Claims is Appealable Under Amended
Rule 54(b) Even if Claims Left Pending Arose from the Same Transaction, 42 VA. L.
REv. 982 (1956).
29. 351 U.S. at 435. This result was also supported by Justice Frankfurter in
his dissenting opinion, id. at 444.
30. Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'r & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 452
(1956) (companion case to Sears).
31. Since the Sears opinion the Supreme Court has not reviewed a single 54(b)
certification to determine its propriety.
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justice to the parties.32  In the application of this balancing process,
several factors have been suggested for the trial court to consider in the
proper exercise of its discretion. 3 Among these factors are the similari-
ty of the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims34 and the possibility that
the appellate review of the terminated claim might be mooted by subse-
quent developments in the trial court." Generally courts view either of
the above situations as wasteful of appellate court time since, in the for-
mer, an early appeal is potentially duplicative of a later appeal on the
unadjudicated claim, and, in the latter, an early appeal may be unneces-
sarily resolved.3" On the other hand, efficiency of the trial court
proceedings has occasionally warranted 54(b) certification despite the
possible existence of duplicative appellate court proceedings.3 7 An
additional factor weighing against 54(b) certification is the existence of
a counterclaim that may create a set-off against the adjudicated claim. It
is considered unfair to the losing party to make an award that may be
reduced by a subsequent judgment in favor of that party.3 8 When the
32. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
33. Dilatory activities by one of the parties may be a consideration in the propriety
of 54(b) certification against that party. United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d
Cir. 1972). For other factors not discussed in the text following this note, see notes 42
& 45 infra.
34. Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 498 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1974);
MeNellis v. Merchants Nat1 Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 916, 919 (2d Cir. 1967);
Rabekoff v. Lazere & Co., 323 F.2d 865, 866 (2d Cir. 1963); Cott Beverage Corp. v.
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 243 F.2d 795, 796 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam); cf. Levin
v. Baum, 513 F.2d 92, 96 (7th Cir. 1975).
35. Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 403 F.2d 939, 943 (2d Cir. 1968);
Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 252 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1958); Cott Beverage
Corp. v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 243 F.2d 795, 796 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
36. See cases cited notes 34 & 35 supra.
37. Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. American Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102, 1105 (10th Cir.
1973); Combined Bronx Amusements, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 132 F. Supp.
921, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 309
(1962).
38. The set-off factor has been given controlling weight only in circumstances in
which the set-off had its basis in transactions that were also the basis of the claim that
the set-off may reduce. Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 498 F.2d 358, 364
(2d Cir. 1974) (the amount owing on the contract might be set off by alleged damages
suffered in the execution of that contract); TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 134 (3d
Cir. 1973) (cashier's checks might be set off by an alleged fraudulent scheme in which
the checks played a part); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Church, Rickards & Co., 58 F.R.D.
594, 596-99 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (in an action in which damages for breach of the contract
might be set off for debts owing under that same contract, the court granted 54(b)
certification but recognized the equitable stance of the set-off claim by staying execution
under FED. R. Civ. P. 62(h)); cf. Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib.
Co., 355 F.2d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 1965) (the recovery for alleged fraud in obtaining the
contract might be greater than the amount owing on the contract; the case did not
involve a 54(b) certification); Schroeter v. Ralph Wilson Plastics, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 323,
326 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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set-off possibility has occurred in the context of unrelated claims, how-
ever, one court has found that the alleged claim of set-off for the
purpose of delaying payment for goods bought in a separate transaction
was an unjust reason to delay entry of judgment.8 9
The great number. of cases, which, "it must be conceded, are not
altogether harmonious,' 40 demonstrate the difficulty of balancing the
efficiency of the judicial process and justice for the parties in the
determination of finality.4' This difficulty may in part be caused by the
tendency of the courts to develop generalities in some cases only to find
those generalities inapplicable when a case is presented in which appli-
cation of that general rule would create inequities.42 Subsequent to the
Sears decision, an influential generality was developed by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Panichella v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.43
39. "The merits of the antitrust action [based on a refusal by defendant to sell its
products to plaintiff] have no effect on plaintiff's duty to pay for goods he ordered and
received prior to the alleged antitrust violations by defendant." Almar Supply Co. v.
Weber-Stephen Products Co., 15 FED. RULES Sav. 2d 54b.32 (E.D. Pa. 1971). This
distinction on the basis of the relationship of the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims is
further supported by a negative inference that may be drawn from TPO Inc. v. FDIC,
487 F.2d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 1973). In refusing 54(b) certification because of a set-off
claim, that court said, "It is critical . . . that . . . [the party whose adjudicated claim is
based on the checks is] the party which participated in the allegedly fraudulent transac-
tion [the basis of the unadjudicated counterclaim] in which the checks played a part."
40. McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536, 545 (1892), quoted in
Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
41. Compare Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 252 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1958),
with Schwartz v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968).
Compare Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. American Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1973),
with CBS v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 271 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1959).
42. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950). "Me
believe that our disposition. . . will make possible a more expeditious and just result for
all parties." Gumer v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 516 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1974).
This court thus showed an inclination to examine the decision of the substantive appeal
prior to a decision as to its appealability. By first resolving the issue of dismissal of the
third-party defendant, the appellate court knew that an initial trial in the absence of this
party would be inefficient, see cases cited note 37 supra. The reversal on the substantive
claim also mooted the possibility of a repeated appellate review. This inefficiency,
dominant in other circumstances, see note 45 infra, was irrelevant because the principal
party not participating in the appellate proceeding was not adversely affected. In
rejecting this generality, the court laid a foundation for another generality, the Allis-
Chalmers requirement for articulation of dominant factors. See note 13 and accom-
panying text supra. See generally text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
43. 252 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 932 (1960). The
influence of this case is fairly clear, e.g., Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. American Petrofina, Inc.,
484 F.2d 1102, 1105 (10th Cir. 1973); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Newton, 398 F.2d 729, 734 (3d
Cir. 1968); Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. H. Muehlstein & Co., 280 F.2d 755, 758-59
(2d Cir. 1960); Gass v. National Container Corp., 271 F.2d 231, 233 (7th Cir. 1959);
Liquilux Gas Serv. v. Tropical Gas Co., 48 F.R.D. 330, 332-33 (D.P.R. 1969) (mem.).
Prior to Allis-Chalmers, however, this author found no reference to the infrequent, harsh
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The trial court had granted 54(b) certification on a summary judgment
dismissing the third-party defendant, while the original claim on which
the third-party claim was based remained unadjudicated. 44 This certifi-
cation had the potential of producing an unnecessary burden for the
appellate court since the issue of third-party liability might be mooted by
failure of the underlying claim.45 But the court of appeals in finding
the certification to be an abuse of discretion created some inflammatory
and misleading dicta. Searching through the notes of the committee
that drafted the 1946 amendment, the Third Circuit discovered that the
draftsmen had stated that the rule should be used only in the exercise of
a discretionary power to afford a remedy in the infrequent, harsh case.40
The natural implication of this statement is that satisfaction of the
standard of 28 U.S.C. section 1291 finality is but one of two criteria for
proper discretion in certification. The second criterion is the necessity
of injustice to the party if there is delay in entry of judgment. The
subsequent judicial adoption of the infrequent, harsh case standard has
the effect of placing a burden of proof on the party seeking 54(b)
certification.47 And it is this burden of proof that led to misapplication
of rule 54(b) in Allis-Chalmers.
The misapplication is clearly demonstrated by comparing the pur-
pose of the amended rule and its interpretation in Sears with the holding
in Allis-Chalmers. The history of the adoption of the amendment and
all the comments of the advisory committee indicate that "[tjhe obvious
purpose [of the 1946 amendment to rule 54(b)] is to reduce as far as
possible the uncertainty and hazard assumed by a litigant" who is
unsure of the finality of a judgment.48 In fact, the historical context of
the amendment seems to indicate that the reference to the necessity of an
infrequent, harsh case was inadvertent and was intended to reduce the
exorbitant flow of appeals of non-final adjudications that had developed
case requirement as grounds for denying 54(b) certification in the context of adjudicated
and unadjudicated claims that had no similarity of facts or issues, See note 38 supra.
44. 252 F.2d at 454.
45. The court recognized two additional reasons indicating that preliminary appeal
was an inefficient use of the judicial process. Because plaintiff was not a party to his
appeal, a decision as to the issue of a release (the basis of the dismissal of the third-party
defendant) could not be binding as between the principal parties. Thus there might be a
need for an additional, inefficient appeal on the same issue. Second, the trial on the
main claim below was being delayed. Id. at 455.
46. Id.
47. This burden of proof coincides with the interpretation of the court in Allis.
Chalmers. 521 F.2d at 365.
48. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512 (1950).
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under the former rule.49 The advisory committee that drafted the
1946 amendment expressly "concluded that a retention of the older
federal rule [which allowed termination and no delay in the appeal of a
distinctly separate claim] was desirable . . ... In addition, although
the Court in Sears allowed the court of appeals to review 54(b) certifi-
cation for abuse of discretion, it clearly implied that adjudicated claims
satisfying the requirements of rule 54(b) in its original form would
also be appealable under the amended rule, provided the district court
made the required certification.-1 Although the Panichella standard of
infrequent, harsh case may be applicable in the case of judgments that
would not have been final under the original rule 54(b), the extension
to judgments that would have been final is unwarranted. Allis-Chal-
mers, with factually unrelated claims, clearly falls in the latter catego-
ry.52  Thus the "set-off which weighs heavily against 54(b) certifica-
tion" might be properly limited to the context of a factually related,
unadjudicated counterclaim. 3
In this context, the efficiency of the judicial process and the
equities between the parties would normally justify delay of appeal until
completion of the entire action. There may be further developments in
the trial of the unadjudicated counterclaim relevant to the adjudicated
claim. A possibility that the appellate court may not have all informa-
tion relevant to the claim indicates the potential inefficiency of early
appellate review.54 In cases in which the adjudicated and unadjudicat-
ed claims are not related and in which subsequent trial court proceed-
ings will not moot the issues that are the subject of appeal, efficiency
within the judicial process is not a factor since the issues before the
49. See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
50. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(b), Notes of Advisory Comm. on 1946 Amendment.
51. 351 U.S. at 436. In both Sears, id. at 428-29, and the companion case, Cold
Metal, 351 U.S. at 446, each court of appeals had affirmed its 54(b) jurisdiction.
Therefore, the ability of the appellate court to find abuse of discretion when the
certified claim would have been appealable under the former rule 54(b) was not
addressed in either opinion. The generally narrow scope of review for abuse of
discretion would seem to indicate that there should be minimal bounds within which the
district courts should have absolute freedom. Since the intent of the framers of the
original rule was substantively adopted by the drafters of the amended rule, see text
accompanying note 50 supra, a sensible boundary for absolute discretion might parallel
the boundary of the original rule. Outside of that limitation the Cold Storage opinion
definitely allows certification to be granted, subject to appellate review for the proper
exercise of discretion.
52. See notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text supra.
53. See cases cited note 38 supra.
54. See cases cited notes 34 & 35 supra.
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appellate court cannot be affected by subsequent developments at trial.5s
The only remaining question in this situation is thus the fairness to the
parties in allowing the set-off to delay execution of the settled claim."0
As in Allis-Chalmers,7 when one party asserting a contested claim has
created the uncontested claim of the adverse party by failing to pay for
goods received, it may be inferred that this is an attempt to collect on the
contested claim prior to its adjudication."8 Under such circumstances
the equities favor entry of judgment on the uncontested claim. When
the adjudicated claim involves unsettled issues making reversal a real
possibility or when the party seeking 54(b) certification is of question-
able solvency so that satisfaction of the set-off claim may not be success-
ful, fairness tends to favor delay of execution until completion of the
entire action.59
55. Almar Supply Co. v. Weber-Stephen Products Co., 15 FED. RuLES SEnv. 2d
54b.32 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
56. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 10 & 11 supra.
58. Justice Gibbons, in his dissent to the Allis-Chalmers decision, clearly felt that
resolution of 54(b) certification in these circumstances was partially based on which
party would finance the liquidated debts. 521 F.2d at 367. A settlement of the entire
action one week after judgment was entered on the original claim for the second time,
see Docket of Proceedings, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co. (E.D. Pa.
1973-75), seemed to support the contention that a basis for the counterclaim was delay
of payment. This was, however, clearly not the case in the Allis-Chalmers action.
Although Judge Newcomer, in granting 54(b) certification, noted the injustice of A-C
financing the indebtedness, see note 59 infra, the party seeking certification felt that
"recertification .. .had no real bearing on the settlement." Letter from Stephen Cozen,
attorney for Allis-Chalmers Corp., to William Dannelly, author, Feb. 10, 1976, on file
at U.N.C. Law Library. The settlement, approximately 50% of the counterclaim and
100% of the main claim, shows that the counterclaim was not specious, and the settle-
ment was therefore probably based on a recognition that the counterclaim was likely to
be tied up in the courts for several years. Id.
59. Following dismissal by the Third Circuit in Allis-Chalmers, Allis-Chalmers
presented a motion for certification of its judgment in accordance with the standards
suggested by the appellate court. After submission of briefs and oral arguments the trial
court analyzed and balanced all of the factors suggested. Order Granting Final
Judgment Under FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1975) (unpublished).
The adjudicated and unadjudicated claims were found to have both unrelated facts
and issues. For that reason an appeal from summary judgment on the debt would
involve neither waste of time nor duplication of effort by the appellate court, id. at 2-3.
Although the issue of indebtedness would not be mooted by completion of trial on the
counterclaim, PECO cleverly argued that another issue would not need to be resolved.
That issue was the contention by PECO that Pennsylvania law controlled on the point
that summary judgment could not be entered during the pendency of a counterclaim. The
court recognized this argument as specious. To allow the mootness of this issue to
prevent 54(b) certification would permit a party to postpone execution simply by making
the objection to summary judgment. Since this objection would always disappear upon
adjudication of the counterclaim, the court of appeals would never have the opportunity
to resolve the issue. Thus an issue that had the purpose of delaying execution could
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Although the specific limits of permissible 54(b) certification are
important, the effectiveness of its application is clearly dependent on the
interaction of the district court and the court of appeals. Putting
discretion in certification within the power of the district court is sensi-
ble because that court is familiar with the case.60 As the bounds of
finality and the purposes of the rule have proved to be sufficiently vague
to subject the rule to misuse," review of district court certification for
proper discretion is clearly warranted.62  For this reason the Allis-
Chalmers requirement that the 54(b) certification be accompanied by
articulation of the dominant factors is soundly premised. It is surely
warranted that the affected parties be notified of the guidelines for the
decision. Similarly, for the reviewing court to determine whether prop-
er discretion was used, it must know the reasons for which judgment
was entered.63 However, the danger remains, as demonstrated by Allis-
Chalmers, that the court of appeals in its review might stifle the effec-
tiveness of rule 54(b) by imposing excessive restrictions on the district
court's ability to issue certifications. 6"
WILLIAM D. DANNELLY
delay execution without resolution of the merits of the issue. An appellate decision on
the question would solve this problem. The court further distinguished Panichella in
that the mooted issue in that case involved the ultimate liability of a party, id. at 3-6.
The court summarily rejected the possibility that the dismissed claim involved any issues
that might necessitate a second appellate hearing on the same issue. The counterclaim
set-off position was similarly rejected, see note 11 supra. In balancing the other factors,
the court noted: (1) The certification would not affect trial on the counterclaim, since
that trial was not being delayed; (2) A-C was denied the use of the money admittedly
owed by PECO, while PECO had already been fully compensated by its insurance carrier
for the damages that were the basis of the counterclaim. The insurance carrier was
subrogated on the counterclaim; and (3) The solvency of A-C and the fact that A-C was
insured guaranteed that, if liability were established, PECO's counterclaim would be
satisfied. Since there were no judicial interests involved and the equitable interests
favored entry of judgment, Judge Newcomer was satisfied that this was an infrequent,
harsh case, id. at 6-8.
60. See note 28 supra.
61. Zangardi v. Tobriner, 330 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
62. It should be noted, however, that the courts of appeals do not seem to be
perfect in their review of proper discretion. See cases cited note 41 supra.
63. See cases cited note 13 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 43-53 supra.
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Constitutional Law-Bursey v. Weatherford: The Sixth Amend-
ment Protection Against Secret Agents in the "Counsels of
Defense"'
The right of a criminal defendant to have the assistance of counsel
is secured by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court has declared that "[tffhis is one of the safeguards
... deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and
liberty."2  Corollary to the right to counsel is the right to privacy in the
attorney-client relationship, 3 which is essential for effective representa-
tion. As interpreted by one court:
The Constitution's prohibitions against unreasonable searches,
and its guarantees of due process of law and effective representa-
tion by counsel, lose most of their substance if the Government
can with impunity place a secret agent in a lawyer's office to in-
spect the confidential papers of 'the defendant and his advisers,
to listen to their conversations, and to participate in their counsels
of defense.4
In Bursey v. Weatherford5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals focused
on the right to counsel in the context of our adversary system of justice
and held that any deliberate intrusion by the prosecution into the
confidential relationship between defendant and his counsel constitutes a
violation of the sixth amendment guarantee. 6
The constitutional issue was raised in federal court when Brett
Bursey brought suit under 42 U.S.C. section 19837 seeking damages
1. See Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
2. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
3. Confidentiality is the basis of Canon four of the American Bar Association
,Code of Professional Responsibility and of the attorney-client privilege in the rules of
evidence. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 201 (Tent. Draft
1970); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 87-97 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
4. Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d at 881.
5. 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3738 (U.S. June 22,
1976).
6. Id. at 486.
7. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted as
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
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from J. P. Strom, chief of the South Carolina State Law Enforcement
Division, and Jack Weatherford, an undercover agent for that Division
assigned to the University of South Carolina campus.8 Bursey alleged
that these officials, acting under color of state law, had invaded the
confidences of his defense team and thus had deprived him of effective
assistance of counsel in his prior criminal trial in state court.9
Bursey's civil suit arose out of an unusual chain of events. On
March 20, 1970, Bursey and several others, including agent Weather-
ford, expressed their opposition to the war in Vietnam by throwing a
brick through the window of the Richland County Selective Service
Office in Columbia, South Carolina, and by defacing the building with
red paint.10 Later that day Weatherford arranged not only for Bursey's
arrest but also for his own, and they were subsequently indicted as co-
defendants for malicious destruction of property."1 The purpose of
Weatherford's arrest was to maintain his cover so that he could continue
working as a secret agent in the university community.'" Weatherford,
with the approval of his superiors, perfected the ruse by retaining
defense counsel and by feigning preparation for trial.'"
During the period prior to trial, Bursey was completely deceived by
the agent's tactics and continued to believe that Weatherford was his
friend and "partner in crime."'14 On at least two occasions, Bursey and
his attorney freely discussed the pending trial in the presence of Weath-
erford.15 Subsequently, the agenfs true status was discovered; and
since he was no longer useful for undercover work, Strom permitted him
to testify against Bursey.' 6 Totally unprepared for Weatherford's in-
criminating eyewitness testimony, Bursey was convicted of malicious
destruction of property. The court sentenced him to eighteen months in
prison, and he served his time.' 7 Thus an opportunity to appeal was no
longer available to Bursey.
The federal district court held that the conduct of Weatherford and
Strom did not violate Bursey's constitutional right to counsel. The
8. 528 F.2d at 484.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 485.
11. Id.
12. Brief for Appellee at 3, Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1975).
13. 528 F.2d at 485.
14. Id.
15. Brief for Appellant at 9-12, Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.
1975).
16. 528 F.2d at 485.
17. Id.
19761 1277
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
court based its opinion on two grounds: (1) there was no "gross"
intrusion into the area protected by the sixth amendment because the
specific intention of Weatherford and Strom was to preserve the agent's
cover, not to spy on the defense team; and (2) since Weatherford did
not communicate any information concerning trial strategy to the prose-
cution, Bursey was not prejudiced by the presence of the opposition at
attorney-client conferences.' 8 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court decision and held that neither "gross" intrusion
nor actual prejudice to defendant is required to sustain plaintiff's claim
for damages for breach of his constitutional right to counsel."0
Before evaluating the court's decision, it is necessary to review the
legal precedent established by judicial elaboration of the constitutional
safeguard. Until the 1930's the essence of the right to counsel was
merely the right of defendant to retain counsel. 20  However, in 1932,
the United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama21 emphasized
the fundamental character of the right to counsel and declared that
"[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. '' 22  Relying on the
fourteenth amendment rather than the sixth, the Court held that at least
in capital cases in which defendants are handicapped by ignorance,
illiteracy, youth, and public hostility, failure to appoint effective counsel
constitutes a denial of due process of law.23
The independent sixth amendment right to counsel was recognized
for the first time in Johnson v. Zerbst,24 a 1938 decision. In that case
the Court looked to the nature of the offense and held that in every
federal criminal case, both capital and non-capital, the accused who is
unable to retain counsel must either have counsel appointed or must
make "an intelligent and competent waiver. '25  Subsequent to Johnson,
the Court gradually expanded the sixth amendment right to encompass
various degrees of state offenses. The landmark decision of Gideon v.
18. Id. at 486.
19. Id. at 486-87.
20. M. AEE NATRY, CIvuL LIBERTIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 181 (2d ed. 1973);
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 599 (3d ed.
1858).
21. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
22. Id. at 68-69.
23. Id. at 71. See generally W. BEANEY, THE RIoHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN
COURTS 229 (1955).
24. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
25. Id. at 465. See also A. HAmDING, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN CRIMINAL PROSECU-
TIONS 40 (1959).
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Wainwright2" in 1963 overruled the prior Court holding in Betts v.
Brady17 and incorporated the sixth amendment into the fourteenth, 2s
thus securing the individual's right to counsel from infringement by state
action. Since the Court found criminal defense attorneys to be "necessi-
ties, not luxuries," 29 state courts were constitutionally required to ap-
point counsel for all indigents defending against felony charges. The
right was recently extended in Argersinger v. Hamlins° to indigents
defending in state courts against misdemeanors punishable by imprison-
ment.
In addition to judicial development of the right to counsel accord-
ing to the nature of the offense, the Supreme Court has analyzed the
sixth amendment protection in terms of critical stages in the criminal
process. The scope of the sixth amendment protection has not been
restricted to actual trial, but has been interpreted broadly so as to
encompass every stage from the time of initial adversary proceedings3'
to post-conviction appeals.12  In Escobedo v. Illinois33 the right to
counsel was found to attach as early as the moment the investigation had
"begun to focus on a particular suspect. '34  However, prior to attach-
ment," the sixth amendment does not bar general undercover activity. 36
26. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally TUFTS UNIVEsrry, THE CouRTs MAKE
POLICY: THm STORY OF CLARENCE EARL GIDEON (1969).
27. 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942). See also I. BRANT, THE BrLL OF RIGHTS 480
(1965).
28. 372 U.S. at 342.
29. Id. at 344.
30. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
31. Pre-trial proceedings at which the Supreme Court has held that the accused has
a right to counsel include arraignment, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961);
lineups, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); and preliminary hearings, Coleman
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
32. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This case was limited to appeals
of right by Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
33. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
34. Id. at 490.
35. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the point of attachment was limited
to the commencement of formal judicial proceedings. The Court distinguished Escobedo
and refused to extend the right to counsel to lineups, which were prior to the "initiation
of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, prelimi-
nary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Id. at 689.
36. 'The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer
or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the
conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we
speak." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963). See also United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966); Comment, Present and Suggested
Limitations on the Use of Secret Agents and Informers in Law Enforcement, 41 U. CoLo.
L. R v. 261, 272-73 (1969).
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Since the accused in Bursey v. Weatherford had been taken into custody
and indicted, his constitutional guarantee was clearly operative.
Proof of intrusion into the sphere protected by the sixth amend-
ment has been held a sufficient ground to overturn a conviction regard-
less of the presence or absence of actual prejudice to defendants. The
United States Supreme Court in two cases, Black v. United States" and
O'Brien v. United States,"8 vacated judgments in the absence of any
showing that the information gleaned from monitored conversations had
been used by the prosecution to the detriment of defendant. 39 These two
decisions were consistent with an earlier declaration of the Court in
Glasser v. United States:40 "The right to have the assistance of counsel is
too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calcula-
tions as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.' 1
The only Supreme Court decision that has deviated from the per se
approach to encroachment upon the sixth amendment right to counsel is
Hoffa v. United States.42  In that case the Court affirmed the jury-
tampering conviction of Hoffa even though a government agent, Partin,
had infiltrated the defense team at Hoffa's prior trial, during which the
bribe was offered. The Court adopted the "separate offense theory,"
finding that Hoffa's incriminating statements to which agent Partin
testified in the later case "were totally unrelated in both time and subject
matter to any assumed intrusion by Partin into the conferences of the
petitioner's counsel in the [prior] trial."4  The Court concluded that if
Hoffa had been convicted in. the first trial, "the conviction would
presumptively have been set aside as constitutionally defective!'"4 on the
ground of gross government infringement of the right to counsel. The
presumption, however, was inoperative in a trial for a different offense.
In Bursey v. Weatherford the court correctly identified the "sepa-
rate offense theory" as the basis of the Ho fa decision and rejected the
prosecutions theory that Hoffa mandated a "grossness" test.45 Indeed
37. 385 U.S. 26 (1966) (per curiam).
38. 386 U.S. 345 (1967) (per curiam).
39. 386 U.S. at 346 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 385 U.S. at 30-31 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
40. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
41. Id. at 76.
42. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
43. Id. at 309. The "separate offense theory" has been adopted by the lower
federal courts. E.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 353 F. Supp. 515, 516-17 (D.D.C. 1973).
44. 385 U.S. at 307.
45. 528 F.2d at 486. Accord, United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965, 976 (3d Cir.
1972).
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two examples4" of government misconduct, analogous to the activity of
agent Partin, were characterized in Hoffa as intrusions of the "grossest
kind. ' 47  However, the Court's dictum does not require classification
according to the degree of offensiveness. Adoption of the "grossness"
test would mean that the presumption of a fair trial could be rebutted
only by showing government intrusion so egregious that the conviction
was actually tainted.48
In order to avoid placing such a heavy burden of proof on the
accused, the Fourth Circuit in Bursey proposed another test, under
which the crucial determination is whether the conduct of the prosecu-
tion represents deliberate or inadverent action. Thus "whenever the
prosecution knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently endangered to
require reversal and a new trial."49  Although the precise holding is
limited by the civil posture of Bursey's case, this dictum is significant in
that it proclaims the court's position on convictions as well as on civil
damages.
The test adopted by the Fourth Circuit is notable in two respects.
First, under the test, specific intent of the prosecution is immaterial since
the mere presence of an authorized government informant for any
purpose constitutes a violation of the right to counsel.50 In our adver-
sary system of justice, "learning the plans of one's opponent . . . is
generally thought to be worthwhile." 51  Thus the "deliberateness" test
protects the accused not only from the possibility of wilful infringement
by the prosecution for the purpose of obtaining evidence but also from
the subtle benefits derived from knowledge of the planned procedure
and state of mind of defendant and his counsel.5"
Secondly, the test eliminates actual prejudice as an essential ele-
ment for sustaining a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
Deprivation is the sole injury to which the statute refers. Thus plaintiff
46. The cases to which the Court refers are Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d
879 (D.C. Cir. 1953), and Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
47. 385 U.S. at 306.
48. See United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965, 977 (3d Cir. 1972).
49. 528 F.2d at 486.
50. Id. The finding of liability under section 1983 without proof of specific intent
is consistent with established authority. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961);
Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74,
81 (3d Cir. 1965).
51. 528 F.2d at 487.
52. Accord, Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 570 (1st Cir. 1968).
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need prove only that some person acting under color of state law
deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the constitu-
tion. Plaintiff is not statutorily required to establish a causal connection
between deprivation and further injury.11
Implicit in the court's expression of the test in terms of civil
relief is approval of the same approach to prejudice in the criminal
context. Overturning a conviction for a deliberate sixth amendment
violation without proof of actual harm is considered a more radical
stance on the issue of prejudice and is therefore unacceptable to some
courts. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Zarzour" viewed "with a
jaundiced eye the conduct of the government" but held that such activity
alone would not vitiate the conviction. 5 The Second Circuit has con-
curred in this position.56 Diametrically opposed is the absolute ap-
proach to the right to counsel that the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals expressed in Coplon v. United States:57 "This is a fundamental
right which cannot be abridged, interfered with, or impinged upon in
any manner."5 8 It appears from the allusion to the criminal law setting
in the Bursey holding that the Fourth Circuit is more inclined to adopt
the latter approach and hold that constitutional rights must be "scrupu-
lously observed" 59 if a conviction is to stand.
The strength of -the test proposed in Bursey is readily apparent.
The obvious difficulties in satisfying either a specific intent or an actual
prejudice requirement would severely restrict the sixth amendment pro-
tection. Although the Fourth Circuit test greatly alleviates the burden
of proof placed on the accused, it fails to embrace fully the per se rule
set forth in Black v. United States and O'Brien v. United States.0° In
the former, the prosecution unwittingly referred to notes that con-
tained excerpts from monitored conversations,"' and in the latter, the
contents of the communications were not even transmitted to the prose-
53. Via v. Cliff, 470 F.2d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 1972); cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493, 504 (1972). However, plaintiff is required to rebut a good faith defense. Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Hill v. Rowland, 474 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1973).
54. 432 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1970).
55. Id. at 3; accord, United States v. Cohen, 358 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
See generally Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TExAs L. Rev.
203, 237-38 (1975).
56. United States v. Mosca, 475 F.2d 1052, 1061 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
948 (1973).
57. 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
58. Id. at 759.
59. Id. at 760.
60. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
61. 385 U.S. at 28.
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cution in any form 62 The weakness of the Bursey test is the court's
apparent departure from the strict per se rule established in Black and
O'Brien when the intrusion in question -is inadvertent. The distinc-
tion turns solely upon a finding of "deliberateness," an imprecise criter-
ion that requires a subjective evaluation of the state of mind of the
prosecution. From the point of view of the accused, knowledgeable
conduct may at times be as difficult to prove as gross activity.
The significance of Bursey lies in its impact on the alministration
of criminal justice. The court's analysis demonstrates a full apprecia-
tion of the ramifications of the right to counsel protection. Undistract-
ed by peripheral issues such as "grossness" and actual prejudice, the
court sought to achieve the fundamental objectives of the sixth amend-
ment. The decision serves two functions that are essential in our
adversary system of justice: (1) misconduct by the prosecution is
deterred, and (2) privacy in the attorney-client relationship is preserved.
Official abuse of a constitutional right is reprehensible in itself. The
fact that the prosecution does not actually benefit from intrusion into
defense counseling does not excuse the violation. 8 Indeed the conse-
quences of abuse for defendant are immaterial in light of the purpose of
section 1983 to preserve constitutional freedoms by punishing the
offending officials.
The second function of Bursey is equally crucial. Privacy is a
prerequisite to an effective attorney-client relationship. Good legal
advice depends upon full knowledge of the circumstances. Unless the
accused feels free to confide in his attorney, the right to counsel is a
hollow guarantee.64
Bursey represents a pragmatic approach to sixth amendment pro-
tection. The court fashioned a solution that reflects sensitivity to the
foreseeable consequences for the accused and that gives substance to the
constitutional maxim. The crux of Bursey is that the right to effective
assistance of counsel remains intact, unfettered by judicial limitations,
thus facilitating the proper administration of criminal justice.
SARA McPEAKE GILKEY
62. 386 U.S. at 346 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
63. Udited States ex rel. Cooper v. Denno, 221 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 968 (1955).
64. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1469, 1475 (1966).
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Contracts-Smith v. Ford Motor Company: Limitation on a
Franchisor's Right To Interfere with Contracts Between a Fran-
chisee and an Employee
The franchise' is an odd legal animal: the product of immense
economic power and technical knowledge on one side and entrepre-
neurial desire and investment ability on the other.' As a result a
franchisor has a great deal of power over a franchisee's operations. 3
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Smith v. Ford Motor
C0.4 held that there were limits to the power that a franchisor, Ford,
could exert over its franchisee, Cloverdale Ford, under a claim by Ford
of legal right to interfere with a contract between a franchisee and an
employee. Essentially, Ford could not procure the termination of
Cloverdale's general manager without good cause.
The claim of legal right has long been a sufficient defense in North
Carolina to claims of tortious inducement of breach of contract.5 Smith
v. Ford Motor Co. signifies an important encouragement to claims of
tortious inducement by marking a departure from automatic dismissal
when a defense of legal right is entered and by increasing judicial
inquiry into the merits of such a defense.
In Smith Ford Motor Company had a terminable at will franchise
1. Attempts to define "franchising" have not resulted in a consensus. See, e.g.,
Fels, Franchising; Legal Problems and the Business Framework of Reference-An
Overview, in Tm FRANcHsIING SoUrcnBOOK 3-9 (J. McCord ed. 1970); McGuire, The
Labor Law Aspects of Franchising, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 215 n.1 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as McGuire].
12. The imbalance is fostered by the fact that the franchisee alone has made the
necessary capital investment; the franchisor has "nothing to lose." See Brown, Franchis-
ing: Fraud, Concealment and Full Disclosure, 33 Omo ST. L.J. 517, 518-19 & n.13
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Franchising]. For a full discussion of automobile dealer
franchises, see Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract,
66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Kessler].
3. Dealer vulnerability in this situation has been traced to the comparatively weak
bargaining power and the "anomalous legal classification of the manufacturer-dealer
relationship." Geilhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Can-
cellations, 1967 DuKE L. 465, 467-68. It is reinforced by policies such as those
exposed in H. BROWN, FRANC HsNG, T mn Fo TmE TRJusnNG (1972). 'The second
largest auto factory guarantees the result of all conferences between its highly trained
executives and the individual dealer by barring any talk whatsoever if the dealer appears
with his attorney." Franchising, supra note 2, at 546.
4. 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Kelly v. International Harvester Co., 278 N.C. 153, 179 S.E.2d 396
(1971); Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 136 S.E.2d 569 (1964). See generally note
24 infra,
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agreement with a reconstituted dealership known as Cloverdale Ford.6
The previously failing franchise had become profitable since the
employment of a new general manager, Jack Smith. Cloverdale Ford,
the franchisee corporation, employed Smith as president and general
manager under a contract terminable at will by Cloverdale. Addition-
ally, the Smith-Cloverdale contract permitted termination for cause if,
in the opinion of Ford Motor Company, Smith proved unsatisfactory
"from the standpoint of profits earned or the manner of operation of
the corporation."7  Subsequently, Smith became active in the Ford
Dealer Alliance, an association of dealers interested in protecting their
position in factory-dealer transactions. Upon Ford's request Smith dis-
affiliated Cloverdale Ford from the Alliance, but refused to end his per-
sonal association with the organization. Ford exerted pressure
on Cloverdale, apparently threatening termination of the franchise.
Cloverdale responded by utilizing the at will clause in Smith's contract,
terminating his employment.
Smith instituted suit against Cloverdale Ford, its majority stock-
holders and Ford Motor Company. The court of appeals approved the
superior court's dismissal for failure to state a claim.8 The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Cloverdale
Ford and its majority stockholders 0 but held that the allegations were
sufficient to state a claim against Ford Motor Company for tortious
inducement of breach of contract, despite Ford's assertion of a right
to interfere."
Liability for inducing breach of contract is founded in Roman law
in a master's action for the indirect injury done to him when his slave
was injured.' 2 The common law counterpart was an action in trespass
6. See § 17.(f) of the franchise agreement, 289 N.C. at 79, 221 S.E.2d at 287.
7. Id. at 82, 221 S.E.2d at 289.
8. 26 N.C. App. 191, 215 S.E.2d 376 (1975).
9. The dismissal was founded on the right of an employer to terminate an
employee whose contract allows for termination at will. This "blinders" attitude toward
the exercise of a termination right is also exhibited in cases of franchise termination.
"[Such right to terminate was not subject to question ...because of motive, intent or
resultant detriment. . . . It is beyond the power of the judiciary to engraft conditions
upon the exercise of such a contractual right." Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F. Supp.
920, 921 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
10. There has been discussion of piercing the corporate veil and holding corporate
officers and stockholders liable for any wrongful action. Avins, Liability for Inducing a
Corporation to Breach Its Contract, 43 CORNELL LQ. 55, 55-58 (1957).
11. 289N.C. at 76, 221 S.E.2d at &5.
12. See Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARv. L Rav. 728
(1928) [hereinafter cited as Carpenter]; Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HAnv.
L. REv. 633 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Sayre]; Comment, Inducing Breach of
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for the loss of the services of a servant. 13 In 1853, the scope of liability
was emancipated from the master-servant limitation in Lumley v. Gye,14
which marked the emergence of liability for tortious inducement of
breach of contract.
The principle of liability for tortious inducement of breach of
contract was first recognized in North Carolina in 1874 in Haskins v.
Royster' 5 when the court imposed liability for inducing a servant to
leave his master. The principle was extended in Jones v. Stanley"'
when the theory in Haskins was extended to cover "every case where
one person maliciously persuades another to break any contract with
a third person. It is not confined to contracts for service."17
In 1939 the Restatement of Torts defined one who would be liable
for tortious inducement of breach of contract as "one who, without
a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third per-
son not to (a) perform a contract with another, or (b) enter into or
continue a business relation with another. ... 8s Comment e pro-
vides that "the actor must have knowledge of the business expectancy
with which he is interfering."'" But it was not until Childress v.
Contract: Herein of Contracts Terminable at Will, 56 Nw. U.L. Rav. 391 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Inducing Breach].
13. See Inducing Breach, supra note 12, at 391.
14. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). The court recognized that the employee was
not a servant but liability was extended for inducement to breach any employment
contract, despite a lack of statutory support. See Sayre, supra note 12, at 667-68.
15. 70 N.C. 601 (1874).
16. 76 N.C. 355 (1877).
17. Id. at 356 (emphasis in original). This extension to non-employment contracts
antedates the English extension by sixteen years. See Inducing Breach, supra note 12, at
393-94. The principle of liability for inducement of breach of contract did not meet
with continued receptivity. In Swain v. Johnson, 151 N.C. 91, 65 S.E. 619 (1909), the
North Carolina Supreme Court repudiated Jones and limited Haskins to its facts; liability
for inducing breach was limited to the master-servant relationship and to situations in
which the means of procurement were tortious in themselves. Subsequent cases either
accepted the limitation of Haskins, as in Minton v. Early, 183 N.C. 199, 111 S.E. 347
(1922), or avoided the discredited principle and relied on doctrines such as unfair trade
practices, as in Smith v. Morganton Ice Co., 159 N.C. 151, 74 S.E. 961 (1912). The
discreditation was furthered in Gibson Land Auction Co. v. Brittain, 182 N.C. 676, 110
S.E. 82 (1921), in which the court said, "In all events, if the plaintiffs be entitled to
recover, they must recover in an action growing out of contract; and none has been
shown with the defendant." Id. at 677, 110 S.E. at 83 (emphasis added). This dictum
indicates a confusion between liability for breach of contract and liability for inducement
of breach of contract.
18. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS § 766(1) (1939). The 1969 tentative draft alters the
definition to "[olne who intentionally induces or otherwise intentionally causes a third
person not to perform a contract with another, other than a contract to marry ....
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 766 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969).
19. RmSTATEMENT OF TORTs § 766, comment e at 56 (1939).
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Abeles ° in 1954 that the North Carolina Supreme Court clearly
enunciated the essential elements of the tort in this state: (1) a valid
contract must exist between plaintiff and a third party;21 (2) defendant
must know that the contract existed; 2 (3) defendant must intentionally
induce the third party to breach; 23 (4) defendant must act without jus-
tification;24 and (5) the breach must cause plaintiff actual damages.2 3
20. 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
21. 240 N.C. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 181. The requirement of a valid contract was at
issue in Henry v. Shore, 18 N.C. App. 463, 197 S.E.2d 270 (1973). An action for
inducement of breach of contract was barred because the oral contract for the transfer of
real estate was in violation of the Statute of Frauds. In Bums v. McFarland, 146 N.C.
382, 59 S.E. 1011 (1907), plaintiff's apparent abandonment of the contract estopped an
action based on inducement of breach of a valid contract. The recognition of the tort of
interference with prospective economic advantage in Spartan Equip. Co. v. Air Place-
ment Equip. Co., 263 N.C. 549, 140 S.E.2d 3 (1965), alleviated the necessity of proving
a contractual relationship in some cases. The tortious conduct interfered with a
relational interest. See generally Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. Rnv. 460, 1041
(1934). That relation can be contractual or pre-contractual. "Where the interference is
with a contract, the privileges to interfere are somewhat more limited than in the case of
interference with prospective dealings . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766,
comment b at 37 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969).
22. 240 N.C. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 181. Notice and intent are linked. See Harper,
Interference with Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 873, 880-81 (1953). In
Morgan v. Smith, 77 N.C. 37 (1877), the court did not impose liability on a defendant
who hired plaintiff's employees because the requisite elements of notice and malicious
intent had not been proven. The exigency of defendant's notice of plaintiff's contract is
amply illustrated by the North Carolina court's response to the land and timber sales
cases: Bruton v. Smith, 225 N.C. 584, 36 S.E.2d 9 (1945), in which the contract to sell
was not duly registered; Winston v. Williams & McKeithan Lumber Co., 227 N.C. 339,
42 S.E.2d 218 (1947), in which the contract to sell was registered; Eller.v. Arnold, 230
N.C. 418, 53 S.E.2d 266 (1949), in which the realtor's exclusive right to sell was not
registered; and Dulin v. Williams, 239 N.C. 33, 79 S.E.2d 213 (1953), in which a timber
deed was not registered. The court held in each case that only inducement of breach of
the registered contract was actionable. Registration was held to be equivalent to legal
notice.
23. 240 N.C. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 181. The necessity of proving intentional
inducement is vital; North Carolina rejected negligent inducement of breach of contract
in Thompson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 165 N.C. 377, 81 S.E. 315 (1914). The element
of intent once required proof of malice as well. That requirement was altered by
Coleman v. Whisnant, 225 N.C. 494, 35 S.E.2d 647 (1945), in which the court refined
the definition of malice when it said, "The word 'malicious' used in referring to malicious
interference with formation of a contract does not import ill will, but refers to an
intereference with design of injury to plaintiff or gaining some advantage at his expense."
Id. at 506, 35 S.E.2d at 656. See also McElwee v. Blackwell, 94 N.C. 261 (1886).
24. 240 N.C. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 181. Various grounds justify actions that would
otherwise create liability for inducement of breach of contract. Business competition
and absolute right are acceptable justifications when the defendant is furthering his own
interests. Protection of public health, morals and safety; disinterested advice; perform-
ance of duty; discipline and responsibility for the welfare of another; protection of
character or reputation; interference with marriage contracts; interference with racial
disputes; and interference prompted by patriotism are justifications when the defendant is
furthering interests other than his own. For a discussion of justification see Carpenter,
supra note 12, at 745-62; Note, Torts: Inducing Breach of Contract: Justifications, 27
COMNELL L. REv. 139 (1941). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 767 (Tent.
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Draft No. 14, 1969), dealing with factors that determine privilege. In the business
competition context, the interest of the actor or inducer is measured against the interest
of the plaintiff in the contract in order to determine whether the actor has been justified.
"If the act is done only for the protection of one of the actor's interests, it must be an
interest of a value greater than, or at least equal to, that of the interest invaded, or if the
interests are similar, the harm which the act is appropriate to prevent must be substan-
tially equal to or greater than that which it is intended or likely to cause." Bohlen,
Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Property and Personality, 39
HARv. L. Rlv. 307, 314 (1926). See also Note, Interference with Contracts at Will-A
Problem of Public Policy, 25 BROOKLYN L. Ray. 73, 77-78 (1958). The justification of
lawful competition as a successful defense to liability for inducement of breach of
contract was introduced in Holder v. Atlantic Joint-Stock Land Bank, 208 N.C. 38, 178
S.E. 861 (1935). The justification was held to create an absolute right to interfere,
however malicious the motive. The competition did, however, have to be lawful, which
was not the case in Sineath v. Katzis, 218 N.C. 740, 12 S.E.2d 671 (1941), when
defendant was held liable for inducing the former owner of a laundry to breach his
noncompetition covenant with the present owner. The privilege of competition was
sharply cut back in Bryant v. Barber, 237 N.C. 480, 483, 75 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1953),
which held that the privilege did not justify interference with existing contractual
relationships. "If contracts otherwise binding are not secure from wrongful interference
by competitors, they offer little certainty in business relations, and it is security from
competition that often gives them value." Carolina Overall Corp. v. East Carolina
Linen Supply, Inc., 8 N.C. App. 528, 531, 174 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1970). This protection
of existing contracts, which is the law today, was approved in Moye V. Eure, 21 N.C.
App. 261, 204 S.E.2d 221, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 590, 205 S.E.2d 723 (1974). See also
Sayre, supra note 12, at 686.
In the case of a business competition defense, defendant's freedom to compete and
the societal interest in a competitive economic atmosphere are considered more impor-
tant than any prospective economic advantage to plaintiff, but less important than the
protection of existing contracts. It was implicit in the holding in Holder v. Cannon Mfg.
Co., 138 N.C. 308, 50 S.E. 681 (1905), that an employment contract at will did not
create a protectible right at all. The treatment of terminable at will contracts has
changed since Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
The most common justification in North Carolina case law is the defense of acting
under legal right. The defense of legal right or absolute right is a complete defense,
whereas the defense of competition is a qualified privilege exercisable only under
certain conditions. See generally Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1894). Insulation from liability resulted in Biggers v. Matthews, 147 N.C. 299, 61
S.E. 55 (1908), when the court issued the following broad dictum about an absolute right
to interfere: "If a person does that which he has a legal right to do, violating no legal
duty or obligation, the motive which prompts him is immaterial." Id. at '302, 61 S.E. at
57. The tentative draft of the second Restatement indicates a different attitude.
Although "[lll will on the part of the actor toward the person harmed is not an essential
condition of liability . .. [t]he presence or absence of ill will . . . may clarify the
purposes of the actor's conduct and may be, accordingly, an important factor in
determining the existence or non-existence of privilege." REsTATEMENT (SE oND) or
ToRs § 766, comment r at 48-49 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969). See also note 23 supra.
Biggers' dictum was followed in Bell v. Danzer, 187 N.C. 224, 121 S.E. 448 (1924), then
in Elvington v. Waccamaw Shingle Co., 191 N.C. 515, '132 S.E. 274 (1926), and was
extended in Beane v. Weiman Co., 5 N.C. App. 279, 168 S.E.2d 233 (1969), when an
employee was found to have a legitimate right to announce that his continued employ-
ment was conditioned on the firing of another employee of whose activities he did not
approve. "Insider" status, which was invoked by the Ford Motor Company in Smith v.
Ford Motor Co., is apparently a legal right acquired through a contractual or fiduciary
relationship.
25. 240 N.C. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 182. There is a controversy in many jurisdic-
tions over the appropriate measure of damages. See generally Commont, Plaintiffs
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The dispute in Smith v. Ford Motor Co.26 revolved around the accept-
ability of Ford's justification for interference: Ford's status as an
"insider" to Smith's employment contract with Cloverdale. The terms
"outsider" and "nonoutsider" were introduced in Childress v. Abeles,27
were never defined, but were applied nonetheless by the courts of
North Carolina in various situations.
Wilson v. McClenny28 gave the court an opportunity to invoke the
immunity of "insiders" from liability for inducement of breach of con-
tract; stockholders and directors were held privileged to cause the cor-
poration to breach its contract with plaintiff. However, "the court did
qualify the privilege in dictum: "As either directors or stockholders,
they were privileged [per written agreement] purposely to cause the cor-
poration not to renew plaintiff's contract as president if, in securing this
action, they did not employ any improper means and if -they acted in
good faith to protect the interests of the corporation." 29
The court of appeals in Sawyer v. Sawyer" suggested that had the
complaint sufficiently stated the elements of the tort, the stepmother
who had advised her stepdaughter and son-in-law to breach the terms
of a consent judgment would have been liable. The court determined that
the stepmother was an "outsider" as to her son-in-law even though the
plaintiff had conceded that she "was an interested party to the perfor-
mance of such consent judgment and a valuable consideration passed
to her, namely, the relinquishing by the present plaintiffs of their efforts
to set aside certain conveyances to the stepmother, defendant."31
Measure of Recovery for Tortious Inducement of Breach of Contract-Profits or
Losses?, 19 HASTINGS LJ. 1119 (1968); Note, Interference with Contractual Relations:
A Common Measure of Damages, 7 SANTA CLARA. LAW. 140 (1966). In McElwee v.
Blackwell, 94 N.C. 261 (1886), the court insisted upon actual damages before recovery
could be allowed. For that reason a new contract or novation is a bar to an action for
inducement of breach of the original contract according to the court in Fowler.v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 555, 124 S.E.2d 520 (1962).
26. 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976). The tentative draft of the second
Restatement extends a defense of privilege to "[olne who has a financial interest in the
business of another. . . if the actor (a) does not employ improper means, and (b) acts
to protect his interest from being prejudiced by the contract or relation." RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) OF TORTS § 769 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969). Comment a defines that
requisite business interest as an "interest in the nature of an investment. A part owner
of the business, as for example, a partner or stockholder, has at least such an interest.
But a bondholder or other creditor may also have it." Id., comment a, at 75-76.
27. 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954). "[Ain action in tort lies against an
outsider who knowingly, intentionally and unjustifiably induces one party to a contract to
breach it to the damage of the other party." Id. at 674, 84 S.E.2d at 181.
28. 262 N.C. 121, 136 S.E.2d 569 (1964).
29. Id. at 133, 136 S.E.2d at 578.
30. 4 N.C. App. 594, 167 S.E.2d 471 (1969).
31. Id, at 599, 167 S.E.2d at 475,
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The boundaries of the "insider"-"outsider" distinction are vital since
an "insider" has a privilege to induce breach of a contract to which he
is not a party, so long as he has a recognized interest.3 2  In Kelly v.
International Harvester Co.3 the franchisor, Harvester, was held to be
an "insider" to the employment contract of plaintiff as general manager
for the franchisee corporation. The franchisor's "insider" status was
apparently the result of several conclusions: that Harvester had a "legal
right under the common law to protect and promote its own interests
in the conduct and success of [the franchisee's] business;"' 4 that
according to the franchise contract Harvester had the right to terminate
the franchise if "there is any change in the principal officers, directors,
management, or stock ownership which in the opinion of the Company
will effect a substantial change in the operation, management or con-
trol of the dealership" 5 and that such a change had occurred when
plaintiff had been hired by the franchisee as general manager without
Harvester's approval; that the franchise agreement giving Harvester
these rights antedated the employment contract; that Harvester could
reasonably believe that the employment of plaintiff as general manager
of this dealership would pull trade from a Harvester dealership in plain-
tiff's hometown nearby; and that Harvester was acting in good faith in
attempting to relocate plaintiff in a similar position elsewhere in the
state.
The language 'of Kelly v. International Harvester Co. was malle-
able enough to allow the court in Smith v. Ford Motor Co. to find the
claim sufficient or insufficient and still employ Harvester's language.
The court in Smith chose to read the Harvester result as mandated by
the cumulative effect of the conclusions above. International Harvester
was held to be an "insider" not simply because it was the franchisor
but because its actions were justified under the contract and were not
suspect as to intent. Although Ford Motor Company might have had
a "legal right. . to protect and promote its own interest in the con-
32. An "insider" has some of the same characteristics as "one who has a financial
interest" in Restatement language. See note 26 supra. "One who has a financial
interest" is privileged to act to protect his interest unless he employs improper means. If
proving "improper means" requires proof that the defendant acted in a manner that
would be tortious, the qualification is meaningless since liability would exist independent
of tortious inducement of breach of contract. The exact definition of "insider" is
illusory, but it seems to require more than a third party beneficiary relationship.
33. 278 N.C. 153, 179 S.E.2d 396 (1971).
34. Id. at 165, 179 S.E.2d at 402.
35. Id. at 164, 179 $.E.2d at 402.
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duct and success of [the franchisee's] business,"36 the result in Smith
indicates that this right alone is not now sufficient under North Caro-
lina law to create an absolute right to interfere. The interference must
be for a specific and lawful purpose.
Ford Motor Company's rights under the contract 7 were restricted or
qualified in the same manner as International Harvester's.38 By the
language of Smith's employment contract with Cloverdale, Ford could
request the termination of Smith's employment only if he proved
unsatisfactory "from the standpoint of profits earned or the manner of
operation of the Corporation. '39  The court in Smith pointed out that
the expressed qualification "clearly indicates that dissatisfaction for the
stated reasons was intended by the parties to be the only justification' '40
for Ford's interference. In Harvester there was a change in manage-
ment that triggered Harvester's absolute right to interfere. In Smith
plaintiff was not only satisfactory from the standpoint of profits and
operation, he was exemplary, reversing the dealership from a losing
franchise into a profitable one.
The court in Harvester concluded that because the franchise agree-
ment antedated the employment contract, parts of the agreement that
referred to operational policy and resulting franchisor rights were incor-
porated into plaintiff's employment contract.41 The issue of incorpora-
tion of Cloverdale's franchise agreement into Smith's employment con-
tract was not raised in Smith because the franchise agreement did not
antedate the employment contract."2 However, if the Harvester con-
clusion is extended, certain language in the franchise contract could
have borne on Ford's defense. The franchise agreement term that
Ford "solicits dealers to bring to its attention through their National
36. Id. at 165, 179 S.E.2d at 402.
37. The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (1970), which imposes upon Ford
an affirmative duty to police the use of its trademark, may consequently give Ford a
right to interfere that is not based upon contract. But since quality control and uniform
use of the trademark are the apparent goals of the provision, Ford should not be able to
justify interference with an efficient, productive operation.
38. Ford claimed an absolute right to interfere because of its status as an "insider."
Justice Holmes' caveat regarding absolute rights is interesting in light of Ford's claim:
"Mhe word 'right' is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a
qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights
are qualified." American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358
(1921). An examination of the premise of Ford's right reveals it to be a qualified right.
39. 289 N.C. at 82, 221 S.E.2d at 289 (emphasis omitted).
40. Id. at 85, 221 S.E.2d at 291.
41. 278 N.C. at 165, 179 S.E.2d at 402.
42. 289 N.C. at 76, 221 S.E.2d at 285-86.
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Dealer Council organization any mutual dealer problems or complaints
as they arise' 43 raised the obligation of Smith to utilize that forum
rather than the Ford Dealer Alliance. However, the use of the word
"solicits" and the "absence of any firm commitment on the part of Ford
to abide by the decisions" '44 of the National Dealer Council indicate
that the use of the grievance procedure set up by Ford is not, and
should not be, mandatory. Furthermore, Smith did disaffiliate the
franchisee, Cloverdale, as requested by Ford and maintained only his
individual membership in the Ford Dealer Alliance.
Other franchise agreement language allowed termination of the
franchise by Ford due to events controlled by the dealer, as in the case
of "disagreement between or among any persons named in paragraph
F [Smith and co-operator of the dealership and minority stockholder
of the franchise, Davis], which in the Company's opinion tends to
affect adversely the operation or business of the Dealer . . .
Even with incorporation, Ford should have been unable to justify its
interference with reference to this language. Although Davis would
have succeeded to Smith's stock interest upon termination of Smith's
employment, 40 Smith did not join Davis as a defendant and no allega-
tion of disagreement between Smith and Davis was made. Further-
more, this right to terminate the franchise was restricted to situations
in which Ford reasonably believed the dealership was adversely
affected. Such a belief in view of increased profits and operational
stability would have been unreasonable.
It is clear that, aside from the disputed lack of justification, Smith
alleged a prima facie case of tortious inducement of breach of contract.
A valid contract clearly existed and was offered in support of the alle-
gation.4 7 Ford did not dispute that it had the requisite knowledge of
the existence of Smith's employment contract; plaintiff as president of
the corporation, Cloverdale, signed the franchise agreement.4 Plain-
tiff alleged that when Ford learned of plaintiff's continued association
with the Ford Dealer Alliance, "it 'wrongfully, maliciously, and unlaw-
fully exerted pressure' upon the stockholders and directors of Clover-
dale to terminate the plaintiff's employment." 49  The resulting dam-
43. Id. at 76, 221 S.E.2d at 286.
44. Brown, A Bill of Rights for Auto Dealers, 12 B.C. INn. & COM. L. Rav. 757,
815 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
45. 289 N.C. at 78, 221 S.E.2d at 286-87.
46. Id. at 82, 221 S.E.2d at 289.
47. Id. at 75-76, 221 S.E.2d at 285.
48. Id. at 77, 221 S.E.2d at 285-86.
49. Id. at 74, 221 S.E.2d at 284.
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ages were at least the loss of the right to compensation. Except
insofar as plaintiff alleged that the interference was "unlawful," there
was no allegation that defendant acted without justification. The court
apparently has modified Childress5" by completely converting the justi-
fication obstacle to an affirmative defense, to be pleaded and proven by
the defendant.5 '
The analogy of the Ford Dealer Alliance to early labor unions is diffi-
cult to avoid.5 Ford backs the National Dealer Council as the griev-
ance and bargaining panel in much the same way industrial employers
once supported company unions whose allegiances, at best, were split.53
Those who disagree with the policy are terminated.5" When "a third
party induced an employer to dismiss an employee before the expira-
tion of his contract term of employment because the employee failed
to support the cause of union labor[, r]ecovery was permitted."' 55
Essentially the same situation occurred in Smith when Ford procured
the termination of Smith because he supported a collective bargaining
unit. Had Ford been allowed to claim the protection of an absolute
right of a franchisor to interfere, the prohibition against collective asso-
ciation would be as complete as in the days of "yellowdog" contracts
for workers.5"
50. 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954). See note 27 supra.
51. The plaintiff put forth a prima facie case without alleging lack of justification;
the burden of proving justification rests with the defendant. Berry v. Donovan, 188
Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603, appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905).
52. For a full discussion of the labor law aspects and implications, see McGuire,
note 1 supra.
53. Company unions were disallowed under § 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1970). Even company established grievance
boards, similar to the Ford Dealer Council, were disallowed. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon
Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
54. The practice of terminating dissenters was not new to Ford. During the
depression in the 1930's, Ford instituted a controversial growth program:
Fresh dealers were given contracts in droves. Experienced agents who op-
posed the new policies and spoke their minds frankly were replaced as rapidly
as possible. Stressing the importance of weeding out "undesirables," the com-
pany reminded branch managers of their wide powers in cancelling franchises.
NEvINs & HILL, FoRD: EXPANSION AND CHALLENGE 1915-1933 (1957), quoted in
Macaulay, Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those
Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers, and the Legal System,
1965 Wis. L. RFv. 483, 497 [hereinafter cited as Macaulay].
55. Weyrauch, Third Parties and the Contract Relationship, 32 BRoOKLYN L. Rnv.
29, 45 (1951) discussing Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603, appeal
dismissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905). See also R & W Hat Shop, Inc. v. Sculley, 98 Conn. 1,
118 A. 55 (1922).
56. A yellowdog contract is an employment contract wherein the employee agrees
to refrain from labor union membership and collective activity. An example of such a
contract is contained in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
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The same equities that favored collective bargaining for labor in the
past support increased power for franchisees now.5  One litigator who
represents franchisees has suggested collective activity by franchisees
as a protective measure against the disparate economic power of
franchisors:
Franchisees and their attorneys should meet with other franchisees
to ascertain franchisor's activities involving: (a) unfair or deceptive
acts or practices; (b) discriminatory practices; (c) price-main-
tenance policies; (d) territorial, customer or other illegal restric-
tions; and (e) other conduct that may be illegal under antitrust
and otner laws s8
A franchisor such as Ford Motor Company who disapproves of fran-
chisees' collective activity often has the convincing power of a termina-
tion at will clause in the franchise agreement to persuade the franchisee
not to participate in groups such as the Alliance. 9
Until franchisees are accorded the same rights and protections as
workers to associate collectively, franchisors can abuse their massive
economic power6° to diffuse any internal opposition. 6' Massachusetts
has met the need with the Franchising Fair Dealing Statute, section ten
57. "Through their dominant economic position, the manufacturers have employed
the franchise, a 'one-sided document which is neither contract, license or agreement,' to
gain maximum control over the management of the dealers' business without correspond-
ing 'legal' responsibility." Kessler, supra note 2, at 1138.
58. Hammond, Litigation Techniques in Representing Franchises, in FRAwcriSmN:
SEcoND GENEnTION PROBLEMS 80 (Practising Law Institute 1969).
59. The breadth of termination at will clauses is discussed in Comment, Franchise
Regulation: Ohio Considers Legislation to Protect the Franchisee, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 643,
664-72 (1972). Automobile dealers have some protection under the Automobile Deal-
ers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970). But, partly because the Act
requires the difficult proof of coercion, there have been few successful actions by
terminated dealers. Macaulay, supra note 54, at 742-43 (Table 2). For the general lack
of success under the Act, see id. at 741-89.
60. 'The dealers are . . . economic dependents of the company whose cars they
sell ....
... Fmhe economic power of Ford over its dealers is so great that dealers who
desperately need Ford cars will be helpless to resist Ford's 'influence' and 'persuasion,'
whether legalistically called 'coercion' or not." Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335
U.S. 303, 323, 325 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting). The economic resources of the
franchisor are also available to prolong litigation, "thereby requiring franchisees to suffer
substantial legal fees" which few can afford. H. BROWN, FRANcHInsNo, TRAP FOR THE
TRUSTNG 95 (1969). "One of the biggest strengths the franchisor has over the
franchisee is the . . . franchisee can't sue-it costs too much." Statement of David
Slater, President of Mutual Franchise Corp., Boston Globe, Feb. 18, 1970, at 68, cols. 1-
8.
61. An injunction against termination of franchises was allowed to stand because
the terminations were intended to harass the leaders of class action litigation. Franchis.
ing, supra note 2, at 544 n.105, discussing In re International House of Pancakes
Franchise Litigation, 331 F. Supp. 556 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1971).
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of which provides: 'Every franchisee shall have the right of free asso-
ciation with other franchisees for any lawful purpose."8 2 Washington,es
Vermont,64 New Jersey65 and Pennsylvania66 also have responded
legislatively to the need to equalize the balance of power; however,
these statutes usually do not provide effective sanctions.6" The
Washington Franchise Act, for example, "merely invalidates 'yellow-
dog' provisions in franchise contracts, [therefore] it accomplishes very
little. ' 08
Ford Motor Company's hostility toward the Ford Dealer Alliance and
toward Smith as a member of the Alliance is the unspoken issue in the
case. The presence of malice does not rebut a privilege to procure
breach of contract in North Carolina. Although plaintiff had properly
alleged the elements of tortious inducement of breach of contract, the
lower courts were restrained from imposing liability if Ford interfered
under a legal right, regardless of information or intimation about Ford's
motives."9 Invocation of "insider" status in answer to the complaint
had been sufficient to establish the legal right and to support a motion
to dismiss. Although the different result in Smith heralds judicial
62. MASS. Gm. LAws ANN. Ch. 93B, § 10 (1975). Massachusetts did not enact
other provisions that would have provided franchisees with a statutory right to bargain
collectively and with procedural protections of the State Labor Relations Act. See text
of the proposed Franchise Fair Dealing Act in THE FRANcmSiNG SoURcEBooK 211 (J.
McCord ed. 1970). For a complete discussion of the proposed Act by its author, see
Brown, supra note 44.
63. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2) (a) (Supp. 1974).
64. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4080 (Supp. 1975).
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7(b) (Supp. 1975).
66. The Pennsylvania statute protects dealers of gasoline, petroleum products and
motor vehicle accessories. Act No. 126 (Nov. 26, 1975), § 4(1), [1975] 3 Pa. Leg.
Serv. 362.
67. 'The [Washington] statute does not actually guarantee the right of franchisees
to associate for any purpose. If franchisees were organized to bargain collectively with
the franchisor or to set retail prices, hours and the like, they could well be in violation of
federal antitrust laws." Chisum, State Regulation of Franchising: The Washington
Experience, 48 WAsH. L. RV. 291, 371 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Chisum]. If the
National Labor Relations Act was applicable to all franchise relationships, sanctions
would exist for franchisor abuse of franchisee rights. For a discussion of the possible
applicability, see McGuire, supra note 1, at 227-49 and Fels, Agency Problems, in
BusINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEmS OF THE FRANcmsE 113-18 (J. McCord & I. Cohen eds.
1968).
68. Chisum, supra note 67, at 371.
69. There have been cases in other jurisdictions in which the courts have expressed
concern over the means of inducement. E.g., Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 A.
600 (1913). "[Clertain bounds must be set to the use of means . . . if a decent regard
for the rights of others is to be preserved and the public welfare conserved." Id. at 649,
86 A. at 603. See generally Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1894).
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recognition of a qualified "insider" status, it may be mandated by the
judicial response to the injustice of allowing Ford's malicious inhibition
of Smith's personal right of association. The tort remedy is inadequate
in several ways. It does not adapt easily to the franchise in which the
"inducer" has a contractual relationship with the parties. It does not
protect a franchisee from "lawful" but malicious interference. Without
an element of malice, punitive damages are out of reach. In all, the
franchise agreement allows the knowledgeable franchisor an opportun-
ity to contract for an absolute right, and the remedy is insufficient to
deter franchisor abuses.
Protective legislation similar to the Massachusetts statute should be
enacted in North Carolina."0 A terminable at will clause in a franchise
contract affords the parties an absolute right to terminate. Neither the
hardship that the clause works nor its unconscionability is considered
because franchise contracts do not seem to provoke the same judicial
protectiveness as standardized contracts.' Furthermore, there is the
possibility of no remedy under North Carolina tort law because the
exercise of a legal right cannot result in liability regardless of motive.
Smith v. Ford Motor Co. allows the franchisee and his employee easier
access to a tort remedy but does not prevent Ford and other franchisors
from simply increasing their power, their "insider" status, in future
franchise agreements. The disparate power the franchise contract puts
in the hands of the franchisors must be balanced. Legislative recogni-
tion of the rights of franchisees and their employees72 would protect
70. Current North Carolina automobile franchise legislation is limited to licensing
procedures and termination requirements. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-285 to -308
(1975). Although at least one writer believes that "[e]nforcement of minimum stan-
dards of fairness is not such an innovative step that it can be taken only as an overriding
matter of public policy or after legislative mandate," Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract
Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465, 468, the pervasive-
ness of the justification defense in North Carolina, with little attention to "minimum
standards of fairness," underlines the need for a statutory remedy to franchisor abuses in
this state. Corrective legislation should respond to this inadequacy as well as to other
inequities prevalent in franchise relationships. See generally Student Symposium" The
Franchise Relationship-Abuses and Remedies, 33 OHno ST. L.J. 641-742 (1972).
71. Gellhorn, supra note 70, at 468. A factor which limitg judicial intervention is
the fact that the complex controls asserted in franchise agreements defy explication by
general practioners and rigid evaluation by most judges. H. BROWN, PRANCHISING, TRAP
FoR THE ThusriNo 95 (1969).
72. For single distributor franchise arrangements it may not be vital to provide
franchisee employees with statutory protections, but in "the larger franchise enterprises,
[a] definitional problem usually lies in determining whether the franchisor is unrelated
to the franchisee's employees, or whether he is a joint employer of them." McGuire,
supra note 1, at 230.
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North Carolina businessmen who associate themselves with national
franchisors and would provide the North Carolina courts with an ascer-
tainable standard by which to scrutinize franchisor abuses.
ELIZABETH ANANIA
Family Law-Constitutional Right of Privacy: The Father in the
Delivery Room
Eleven years ago in Griswold v. Connecticut1 the United States
Supreme Court gave full constitutional recognition to a broad and
fundamental realm of protected human conduct. This conflux of rights
was termed generally by the Court as the right of "privacy."'2 With the
source of this newly developed right ambiguously stated and its scope
extremely uncertain, lower courts have had little guidance in determin-
ing the bounds of its practical application. In the recent case of
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital' Judge John Paul Stevens of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (now Justice
Stevens of the United States Supreme Court) was presented with the
problems of determining the breadth of the right to privacy and the
limits placed upon it by countervailing societal interests. At stake were
the important, if not fundamental, rights of a father, mother and doctor4
in having the father present in the delivery room at childbirth.5 The
court, unwilling to entangle itself in a medical dispute,6 held that the
parents' interest in having the father present was of insufficient magni-
tude to invalidate hospital regulations forbidding fathers from entering
the delivery room.'
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Id. at 484.
3. 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975).
4. Plaintiffs argued that the hospital regulations improperly restricted their doc-
tors' rights to practice medicine. Although the trial court found no standing in plaintiffs
to assert their doctors' rights, the court of appeals found standing under Griswold in
which a doctor was allowed to assert his patient's rights. The appellate court ruled that
since plaintiffs had no protected rights in themselves they had no greater claim when
standing in their doctors' stead. Id. at 721-22 & n.23.
5. Id. at 717.
6. Id. at 721.
7. Id.
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Plaintiffs in Fitzgerald were married couples who had completed
training" in the psychoprophylactic method, or as it is more commonly
known, the Lamaze method of natural childbirth. At the filing of the
complaint in federal district court,'" each couple, with one exception,
was either expecting a child or had recently had a child at Porter
Memorial Hospital,"' the public hospital named as defendant.' 2 Seek-
ing injunctive and declaratory relief and damages' on the ground that
their constitutional rights of privacy had been violated,1" plaintiffs1r
challenged the official hospital policy that prohibited the "presence of
8. Plaintiffs presented in their brief a summary of their required childbirth
preparation:
This method requires a serious commitment on the part of those partici-
pating. Husbands and wives must attend a series of classes that include lec-
tures, films, question and answer periods, instruction in controlled breathing
and relaxation techniques, and discussions on various pregnancy-related topics.
This advance preparation and training serve to prepare the couples for the
events that take place during pregnancy, labor and delivery, and enable them to
function as a team during labor and delivery, with the husband supplying
physical and emotional support to his wife. 523 F.2d at 717 n.2.
9. The Lamaze method is a recognized "method of analgesia (pain relief)" in
childbirth that was "evolved" in the West by the French scientist Lamaze. It is traceable
to its original developer, the famous Russian scientist Pavlov. Olds & Witt, New Man in
the Delivery Room-the Father, TODAY'S HEALTH, Oct. 1970, at 52, 55.
The theoretical basis of the method has been described as giving "a woman's brain
so much to think about consciously and so many new reflexes to deal with subconscious-
ly, that whatever pain might occur cannot register on the brain." Part of the husband's
role is "to keep his wife's brain busy coordinating the breathing rhythms and relaxing
techniques she has learned." Id.
10. The district court's decision and opinion were given in an unreported memoran-
dum decision on September 10, 1974. 523 F.2d at 718.
Jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). 523 F.2d at 718
n.4. An alternate basis of jurisdiction was set forth in the complaint under 28 U.S.C.
section 1331 (1970) with the requisite statement of amount in controversy. 523 F.2d at
718 n.5.
11. 523 F.2d at 717.
12. Also named as defendants were members of the board of directors and the
administrator of Porter Memorial Hospital. Id. at 718.
13. Id.
14. In particular it was alleged that the first, fourth, ninth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the Constitution were violated. Id. 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (1970) was used
as a remedial basis, 523 F.2d at 718 & n.4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The court of appeals noted that there was no question that Porter Memorial Hospital was
"a public hospital and that its actions are 'under color of state law' within the meaning of
§ 1983." 523 F.2d at 718 & n.4.
15. Plaintiffs sued on behalf of others similarly situated as well as on their own
behalf, id. at 718; however, no ruling was rendered by the district court on the request
that the suit be certified a class action. Id. at 718-19. The court of appeals did not
touch upon this issue.
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any person... in the Delivery Rooms.. . other than.. . Medi-
cal. . . and Nursing Staff."' 6
The district court dismissed the complaint, finding no constitution-
al violation since plaintiffs were not denied access to the hospital facil-
ities. Nor were they totally prohibited from using a medically approved
operation.17 In addition it was held that plaintiffs had no standing to
assert the rights of their physicians.' 8  On appeal, Judge Stevens, writ-
ing for the Seventh Circuit, upheld the district court's dismissal of the
complaints.'9
Although the court of appeals acknowledged that the decision to
have or not to have a child is constitutionally protected, the court held
that the decision of "where, by whom, and bywhat method" a child is
delivered is of a lesser magnitude. 20  Based upon this conclusion,
the court found that the parents' interest in their children gave them no
"greater right to determine the procedure to be followed at birth than that
possessed by other individuals in need of extraordinary medical assist-
ance."
21
Having found in this manner that the parents' rights were not of
fundamental importance, the court noted two policy considerations that
it used to justify its dismissal of plaintiffs' case. First, the court ex-
pressed concern that a decision in plaintiffs' favor would require a
holding grounded in the rights of the individual as opposed to rights that
have their origin in marriage.22 Since these rights could not be limited
to the marriage relationship, the court feared that such a decision could
be easily extended to create new rights of "companionship" in unwed
parents and patients in stress about to undergo serious surgery,2" and
16. Id. at 717.
17. Id. at 718-19.
18. Id. at 719.
19. Id. at 722. By the time the case was reviewed by the court of appeals all
plaintiffs had given birth to their children; however, the court found that the case was
not moot under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973): "Pregnancy provides a classic
justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be 'capable of repetition yet
evading review."' Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d at 717-18 n.3, quoting
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 125 (1973).
20. 523 F.2d at 721.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 720. The court recognized that the Supreme Court placed emphasis upon
"the private aspects of the institution of marriage" in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); however, Judge Stevens noted that Griwsold was not limited narrowly to
marital rights. 523 F.2d at 720. The court's concern is borne out by the fact that
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Jane Roe's right to abortion was based on a
"privacy" right though she was not married when pregnant.
23. 523 F.2d at 720 n.16.
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additionally, could be extended to a patient claiming a right to choose
surgical procedures to be used. 4 Secondly, the court observed that
there were "valid medical reasons for exclusion in individual cases. '2 5
Consequently, the court found it too unpalatable a result to impose an
"inflexible rule upon all hospitals" by substituting its own judgment for
the "professional judgment" of the hospital staff.26
The weight that should be given the parents' interest in choosing
delivery procedures must be determined by reference to the Supreme
Court "privacy" decisions preceding Fitzgerald. As long ago as 1891
the Supreme Court gave protected status to a form of personal privacy
right, which it articulated in Union Pacific Railway Company v. Bots-
ford as the "inviolability of the person."27 Various later decisions found
that rights of personal autonomy deserved constitutional recognition in
equal protection or due process contexts in activities relating to mar-
riage,26 family relationships,29 control over one's children's education, 0
and procreation.3 1 These family related rights were deemed "fundamen-
tal"32 or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"838 the threshold
prerequisites to constitutional protection and close judicial scrutiny.8 4
Breaking with the tradition of piecemeal cataloguing of fundamen-
tal personal rights, Griswold v. Connecticut5 recognized that there were
"zones of privacy" formed by the "penumbras" of specific guarantees
listed in the Bill of Rights,86 in particular, the first, third, fourth, fifth
and ninth amendments.8 7  Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in
Griswold, found that the marriage relationship was embraced by one of
24. Id.
25. Id. at 721.
26. Id. at 721-22.
27. 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891).
28. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statutes prohibiting marriages between
races violative of equal protection and due process).
29. See id.; cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 ,U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting dis-
tribution of contraceptives to single people violative of equal protection).
30. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (statute preventing parents
from sending children to religious schools violative of due process "liberty"); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute forbidding teaching of foreign language violative
of due process "liberty").
31. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization law violative of equal
protection).
32. See, e.g., id. at 541.
33. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
34. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Id. at 484.
37. Id.
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these constitutionally preserved "zones of privacy" and that it thus
required close judicial scrutiny, which in Griswold resulted in invalida-
tion of the offending legislation."' The difficulty in determining the
source, meaning and scope of the marital right to privacy, as well as in
determining the balancing test to be utilized when the right is present, is
compounded by the diversity of viewpoints on each aspect of the issue
expressed by the individual concurring justices in Griswold.
Justices Goldberg, Warren and Brennan, in a concurring opinion
in Griswold,39 identified the ninth amendment as the source of the
marital right to privacy, an additional, fundamental personal right re-
served to the people.40 Accordingly, this ninth amendment right was
viewed as being within the sheltering concept of "liberty" in the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause.41 With such a right in ques-
tion, Goldberg, Warren and Brennan required that the state show an
interest that was "compelling" or the statute could not be sustained.42
Justices Harlan and White, who wrote separate opinions concurring in
the result,43 found the due process clause to be sufficient in itself to
establish the marital right to privacy.44 While Harlan would seemingly
require the state to show a compelling interest,45 White demanded that
there be a showing of "substantial justification" before a state can enter
into this "realm of family life."'46 These divergent notions have left
many unanswered questions concerning the right of privacy.47 How-
ever, it is clear that regardless of its origins or its breadth, there is a
constitutional right to privacy that attaches to at least some family
relationships, particularly the marriage relationship.4 s Furthermore,
when it is present and is threatened there must be, at a minimum, a
38. Id. at 485-86. Douglas expressly rejected a return to the substantive due"
process approach present in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In addition to
citing the cases that overruled the Lochner approach, Douglas wrote: "We do not sit as
a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch
economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions." 381 U.S. at 482.
39. 381 U.S. at 486.
40. Id. at 488, 491-92.
41. Id. at 493.
42. Id. at 497.
43. Id. at 499, 502.
44. Id. at 500, 502.
45. See id. at 499-502.
46. Id. at 502.
47. Plaintiffs in Fitzgerald appeared unsure of the source of the right of privacy
themselves since they based their claim on both the penumbral rights from the Bill of
Rights and the word "liberty" in the due process clause. 523 F.2d at 719.
48. See text accompanying notes 62-69 infra.
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showing of "substantial justification" for the encroaching statute or
regulation.49
The nature and the limits of this marital or family-related zone of
privacy are the critical factors in determining whether parents have the
right to assure the father's presence at childbirth. The cases used by the
Griswold Court to illustrate the application of the right to privacy show
that this right encompasses two general, separate catagories of rights.10
First, there is the "right to be let alone."" Secondly, there is an
affirmative, "activist"52 right possessed by people generally that is char-
acterized best as the right to the "orderly pursuit of happiness."5" It
was this latter category of rights that plaintiffs pressed upon the appel-
late court in Fitzgerald. Judge Stevens described this right as "the
individual's right to make certain unusually important decisions that will
affect . . . [ a person's] own, or his family's, destiny." 4
The court of appeals' finding in Fitzgerald, that the interests put
forward by plaintiffs did not represent "'basic values'... dignified by
history and tradition," 55 was based upon two conclusions: that the
father's presence was of less importance than the protected right to
have a child,56 and that privacy rights did not grow out of family re-
lationships but out of the individuals' rights.57 Asserting that the
source of any privacy rights in marriage is the right of privacy in the
individual, the court attempted to justify its refusal to give special
consideration to the marital and family relationships.5 Although it is
unquestionably true that rights in marriage stem from individual
49. For an in-depth study of Griswold, the right to privacy and its historical roots
see Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1965);
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1410 (1974); Kauper, Penumbras,
Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold
Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1965).
50. See cases listed at 381 U.S. 482, 484 and note 51 infra.
51. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
A more recent case illustrating this principle is Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)(a state's power to regulate obscenity does not extend to mere possession by individual of
obscene material in his own home).
52. The "activist"/"passive" rights dichotomy was considered in Dixon, The Gris-
wold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MiCH. L.
Rnv. 197 (1965).
53. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). It was held in Loving that freedom
to marry was one of these essential personal rights.
54. 523 F.2d at 719.
55. Id. (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 721.
57. See id. at 720-21.
58. See id,
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rights, 9 the appellate court ignored a great many cases that have held
that the "private realm of family life!"60 is an area of particular import-
ance and sensitivity.81
The cases that have dealt with family relationships portray a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. '62  The right
of privacy consists of more than a parent's right to have or not to have
children.6 3 It is more than a parent's right to send a child to religious
schools6 or to have his children study a particular subject.6 5 The right
to privacy is more than the right to marry freely66 and more than the
right to "establish a home and bring up children. 67 These are simply
the landmarks of a "zone of privacy" that surrounds "family life,"68
"something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its pro-
tection the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional
right."6 9 In light of this history of the fundamentality of family life,
Judge Stevens has left the question of parental rights unresolved by
writing that the right to determine the manner in which one's child is
born is less important than the right to decide to have the child. 70
If the hospital has entered into this realm of family affairs, the
court was obliged to seek out some form of "substantial justification" if
it were to uphold the restrictions." ' The court need not have upheld
plaintiffs' case, but it was obliged to examine plaintiffs? claims in
59. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
60. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
61. See cases cited notes 62-69 infra.
62. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965), quoting Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (emphasis added).
63. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
64. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
65. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
66. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
67. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
68. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). It
should be noted that reference was made in Griswold to this dissenting opinion as
authority. 381 U.S. at 484.
69. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
70. An appropriate analogy exists in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In
Meyer the Court said that liberty "denotes.. .the right.. . to marry, establish a home
and bring up children." Id. at 399. The Court did not stop at that point but held that
the parents had a right to have their children study German, contrary to the Nebraska
statute. Bringing up one's children in a chosen manner (to learn German) in effect was
included within the more important right, the right to have and bring up children
generally. Although the right to choose the manner in which one's child will be born is a
less important right, it appears to be part and parcel of the larger right, the right to have
and to rear children.
71. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra,
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relation to the "medical" interests asserted by defendant hospital. In
short, the court was duty-bound to scrutinize the conflicting interests
and balance them in reaching its decision. 72 If after careful examina-
tion the court had dismissed plaintiffs' case it would have done so on
firmer ground. However, direct judicial review of the hospital rules was
refused.7 3
The court refused review of the regulations in deference to the
medical profession.74 The dissent in Fitzgerald argued strongly for at
least a hearing of the evidence. 75 If the court had weighed the evidence
carefully it might have been unable to support soundly its decision
upholding the hospital regulations.
In a footnote Judge Stevens listed several medical articles illustrat-
ing the split in medical opinion and supporting his conclusion that there
were valid "medical reasons" for sustaining the hospital rules. 70  The
strongest argument made in these articles against a father's presence
consisted of a list of "medical reasons" that may be summarized in part
as follows (some of which apparently influenced and were incorporated
into the court's opinion): 77 (1) anything can go wrong in the delivery
room; (2) "using the tactics of this lobby [i.e., persons seeking to
enforce these rights of privacy through legislative or other legal means],
and with similar reasoning" the principle may be extended to other
operations; (3) intimacy has its limits--"a girl simply is not at her
romantic best in a delivery room;" (4) the training of doctors and other
medical personnel is more difficult and less effective with the father
present; (5) the increased threat of malpractice suits growing out of a
husband's account of the doctor's actions; (6) risk of infection-every
person whose presence is not essential should be excluded.7
There are several difficulties with using such reasoning as exem-
plary of valid "medical reasons" as the court did in Fitzgerald. A
couple's romantic concerns clearly are beyond the range of a doctor's
expertise in delivery room procedure. The fact that parents' rights may
be extended to future cases is primarily a legal matter, not a medical
72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is an example of such a balancing
approach.
73. 523 F.2d at 720.
74. Id. at 721.
75. Id. at 722.
76. Id. at 721 n.22.
77. See id. at 720 n.16 & 721 n.22.
78. Morton, Fathers in the Delivery Room-An Opposition Standpoint, HosPrTAL
Topics, Ian. 1966, at 103-04.
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issue. Assuming that there is a real threat of an increase in the number
of malpractice suits, which is in itself questionable, 9 again it is a legal
argument, not a medical justification. Additionally, questions arise as
to the seriousness and the urgency of the claim that student doctors may
have trouble learning about delivery procedure when the father is
present. The only specific "medical reason" listed in the article cited by
the court is the possibility of infection caused by the father's presence
(this concern was also raised as a "medical reason" by the defendant
hospital). However, that possibility is not based upon a greater likeli-
hood of a properly prepared father causing infection, but a greater
likelihood of infection generally with the increased number of persons
present during childbirth.80 Ironically, no such concern was expressed
about increasing the chance of infection by the presence in the operating
room of a number of student medical personnel. Although the court
did not expressly accept all of the listed reasons in its rationale, it im-
plicitly recognized them as valid medical justifications and as evidence of
a medical dispute.81
It is probable that there are valid and important medical reasons
beyond those noted by the court in its footnote of medical authority, but
it is clear that Judge Stevens -bowed too easily to those persons within the
medical profession who voiced objections to the Lamaze or related
procedures. In addition, there was an impressive array of "uncontra-
dicted" evidence within the record that included surveys that reported
more than 45,000 births without a single infection "traceable to the
practice [of childbirth with the father present] and not one malpractice
suit."'8 2 Also, the record of the district court contained affidavits by a
Clinical Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology of the Chicago School
of Medicine who found "no evidence in current obstetrical literature
indicating that the presence of husbands . . . (assuming proper safe-
guards are taken) would be hazardous. . . ."83 The benefits of the
method were summarized by the professor (who had delivered approxi-
mately one thousand babies in the past four years with fathers present)
as follows: (1) "the father's presence. . . has an extremely stabilizing
effect on the mother;" (2) the mother is able to "bear down more
79. The dissent noted surveys contained in the trial court record -that showed that
in over 45,000 births with the father present, no malpractice suit arose. 523 F.2d at 722.
80. Morton, supra note 78.
81. See 523 F.2d at721 &n.22.
82. 523 F.2d at 722.
83. Id. at 723.
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intensively," shortening labor; (3) the shortened labor increases the
chance of a baby being healthy and decreases the possibility of hypoxia
(insufficient oxygen); (4) "no greater number of hospital personnel are
in attendance when the father is present .... -4 Also, the doctor
stated that he had had no serious incident occur due to the father's
presence in approximately one thousand births. In light of this evi-
dence the dissenting judge was surely justified in his view that an
evidentiary hearing was required.
The Fitzgerald decision is important in three respects. First, it
provides one court's answer to the broader issue presented-when there
is a dispute within the medical profession the courts should not inter-
vene. Secondly, it establishes an unfortunate but influential precedent
in its denial of the parents' interest in having the father in the delivery
room. Thirdly, Fitzgerald provides an interesting view of the approach
of Justice Stevens toward the right of privacy, a right championed by his
predecessor, Justice Douglas. If Fitzgerald is an indication of how
Justice Stevens views the right of privacy, it is unlikely that this right will
be extended beyond the facts contained in the cases that have espoused
it.
If this right to privacy is a right that has been created and expand-
ed to meet the needs of a changing society, which it apparently is,85
Fitzgerald presents an ideal case for its application. Childbirth with
husband participation is of growing significance88 and comes easily
within the realm of the marital and family relationships. It is not the
final decision reached in Fitzgerald that is worrisome, for there may be
truly weighty medical or other reasons for upholding the hospital rules.
However, the court should have looked at the strength of the medical
evidence and applied it to the particular case before it, keeping within its
consideration less drastic alternatives.8a If in the balance the same
84. Id. at 722-23.
85. This point is presented very convincingly in Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy,
74 COLUM. L Rnv. 1410, 1427-31 (1974).
86. The American Society for Psychoprophylaxis in Obstetrics (ASPO) has esti-
mated that approximately 247,500 couples were trained in the Lamaze technique in 1975.
Letter from Melba A. Gandy, Executive Director of ASPO to NoRTI CAROLINA LAW
REVIEW, Jan. 22, 1976, on file in U.N.C. Law Library.
Ms. Gandy also expressed concern that new dangers would arise with hospital rules
restricting a father's presence: a danger that is becoming more and more evident is that
when hospitals do not permit the father to be present, couples are choosing to have their
child at home, physically separated from hospital facilities that may be vital in the event
of difficulties during delivery. Id. at 2.
87. Possible compromise measures were suggested in Goetsch, Fathers in the
Delivery Room-'Helpful and Supportive,' HosPrrAL ToPics, Jan. 1966, at 104,
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decision were reached it would have been a better result than shying
away from the right because the balance was difficult or controversial or
because it called into question medical opinions. Constitutional rights
can be dealt with and medical concerns may at the same time be given
due weight and respect.
Epic M. NEWMAN
Hospitals-A Current Analysis of the Right to Abortions and
Sterilizations in the Fourth Circuit: State Action and the
Church Amendment
The United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade' found that the
right of privacy guarantees a woman the prerogative of having an
abortion "free of interference by the State."2 The right of privacy also
includes the fundamental right to decide whether to bear or beget a
child3 and therefore implicitly encompasses the sterilization decision.4
However, in Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton,' the Court let stand
a section of the challenged Georgia abortion statute that allows a hospital
to refuse to admit a patient for an abortion. The Court noted that the
purpose of this provision was "obviously... to afford appropriate pro-
tection.., to -the denominational hospital."6 Thus an enigma remains:
how valuable is the Roe guarantee to an abortion or sterilization free of
state interference if under Doe some hospitals may absolutely refuse to
admit patients for such operations?'
As Roe guarantees abortions "free of interference by the State," an
initial inquiry must concern the scope of the duty thus imposed. Clear-
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 163. The absoluteness of the right depends on the trimester of
pregnancy concerned.
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
4. Compare the sterilization decision with the personal rights listed in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53 that have been held to be part of the right of privacy.
5. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
6. Id. at 198. However, the Court generally spoke in terms of "hospital" without
any qualification.
7. The Roe and Doe opinions are to be read together. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at
165.
8. See Note, Hill-Burton Hospitals after Roe and Doe: Can Federally Funded
Hospitals Refuse to Perform Abortions?, 4 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 84
(1974).
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ly a state cannot pass a statute forbidding abortions during the first two
trimesters of pregnancy since the Roe decision directly invalidated such
a statute.9 But the Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the
state ever has a duty to insure the availability of such procedures. 10 If
the state must insure access to facilities that offer these operations, the
nature of the state's relationship with a particular hospital becomes
crucial for execution of this duty. Hospitals generally incorporate and,
thus, traditionally have been classified as either public or private by
corporation law.11 The due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment has been held to apply to public hospitals in the context of staff
membership. 12  The Supreme 'Court in Roe found the right to an
abortion to be based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.13 Thus, not surprisingly, several courts since Roe have held that
a public hospital must allow nontherapeutic abortions and sterilizations
when the hospital offers other procedures that involve the same amount
of risk and care, and when the hospital's failure to allow abortions or
sterilizations would result in denial of the patient's fundamental right to
such operations.' 4 If these courts are correct in construing Roe as
imposing an affirmative duty' on the state to insure that a publicly
owned hospital that offers medically indistinguishable procedures also
offers abortions and sterilizations when the individual's fundamental
right would otherwise be abridged, then, upon a finding of state action,
9. 410 U.S. at 164.
10. The Supreme Court recently denied a writ of certiorari to two cases that would
have potentially presented this issue to the Court: Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 44
U.S.L.W. 3492 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976) (White, J. and Burger, C.J., dissenting), denying
cert. to 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975) (sterilization); Greo v. Orange Memorial Hosp.
Corp., 96 S. Ct. 433, 436 (1975) (White, J. and Burger, CJ., dissenting), denying cert.
to 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975) (abortion).
11. Note, The Physician's Right to Hospital Staff Membership: The Public-Private
Dichotomy, 1966 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 485, 486. The author argues that since the purpose
of a hospital is to serve the public rather than to make a profit, the public/private
dichotomy has little meaning in the hospital context. Apart from corporation law, the
distinction is invalid since public and private hospitals cannot be distinguished on the
basis of purpose or function. Id. at 514-15.
12. See cases collected in id. at 487-91.
13. 410 U.S. at 153.
14. See Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 1975) (abortion); Doe v. Hale
Hosp., 500 F.2d 144, 147 (1st Cir. 1974) (abortion); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495
F.2d 1342, 1347, 1378 (8th Cir. 1974) (abortion); Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp.,
475 F.2d 701, 705-06 (1st Cir. 1973) (sterilization). The actions were based on the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
15. Although the Constitution does not usually impose an affirmative duty on a
state, the state's previous involvement in unconstitutional conduct may allow for such an
imposition. A state's unconstitutional abortion statute should suffice for this inolve-
ment and render any later attempt at neutrality insufficient for adequate protection of
the right to an abortion. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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Roe would also compel the state to require a private hospital to offer
such procedures under identical circumstances. Whether the requisite
state action can be found in a private hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton
funds is unclear.
The Hill-Burton Act 6 provides a highly regulated program de-
signed to assist a state in furnishing adequate hospital care to all its
citizens. Once a state decides to participate in the program, a state
agency is responsible for administering the plan within the statutory
guidelines.' 7 The Fourth Circuit has consistently held that a hospital's
receipt of Hill-Burton funds is a sufficient basis for a finding of state
action.18 Although it has never directly addressed the issue in the
abortion-sterilization context, in the recent case of Doe v. Charleston
Area Medical Center, Inc.,'9 the court implied that it would also apply
this state action doctrine in such cases.20 Whether the Fourth Circuit
should apply this theory of state action in the abortion-sterilization
context must be considered in light of recent judicial and congressional
action to the contrary.
The landmark case finding state action on the basis of receipt of
Hill-Burton funds is the 1963 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital." The suit was
brought by black patients and doctors who were denied treatment and
staff privileges respectively by the defendant hospitals on the basis of
race.2 2  The court relied on two aspects of the Hill-Burton program to
support a finding of state action in accord with previous Supreme Court
holdings. First, participating Hill-Burton hospitals "operate as integral
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-91o (1970). Public and nonprofit hospitals are eligible. 42
U.S.C. § 291a(b).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 291d(a) (1)-(2) (1970).
18. E.g., Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.
1974); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); Cypress v.
Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967); Smith
v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966); Simkins v. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938
(1964). See also Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
19. Civil No. 75-1161 (4th Cir. Nov. 6, 1975). Hill-Burton funding was not
necessary because the hospital involved was complying with a state law by refusing to
offer nontherapeutic abortions. Id. at 9. However, in an earlier unrelated case, this
same hospital was found to be "sufficiently imbued with state action by receipt of Hill-
Burton funds to invoke application of the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 7. That
finding came in Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th
Cir. 1974).
20. See Civil No. 75-1161 at 7-9.
21. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
22. Id. at 962.
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parts of comprehensive joint or intermeshing state and federal plans or
programs designed to effect a proper allocation of available medical and
hospital resources for the best possible promotion and maintenance of
public health."23  Thus the hospitals and the state were joint benefi-
ciaries within the rationale of Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority.2 4  The fact that the object of both the state and the hospitals
was to furnish the public with adequate medical care strengthens this
analysis. 25 Second, "[u]pon joining the program a participating State
in effect assumes, as a State function, the obligation of planning for
adequate hospital care," -0 and it is irrelevant for fourteenth amendment
purposes that the instrument utilized would otherwise be private. The
23. Id. at 967 (footnote omitted).
24. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Burton concerned a private restaurant, located in a
public building, that refused to serve blacks. The Court's finding of state action rested
in part on the benefits mutually conferred on the state and the restaurant because of the
restaurant's location.
By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made
itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, prop-
erty and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that
account, cannot be considered to have been so "purely private" as to fall with-
out the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.Id. at 725.However, recent Supreme Court decisions define state action narrowly. In 1972,
the Supreme Court decided Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), in
which state regulation pursuant to the issuance of a liquor license to a private club that
had discriminatory policies was held insufficient for a finding of state action. In 1974,
the Court held in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), that a state
regulated private utility company could terminate electric service to a consumer without
complying with formal due process requirements, despite its monopolistic status and the
essential nature of its product. By basing the holdings on the absence of state
involvement in the challenged activity, the Court appears to be limiting the holding of
Burton. However, the nature of the state's involvement with a Hill-Burton hospital is
more analogous to Burton than to either Moose Lodge or Jackson. By participating in
the Hill-Burton program, the state is essentially going into the hospital business. Offering
surgical procedures is the crux of that business. Therefore, there is a symbiotic
relationship between the state and the hospital that meets the requirements of Burton.
In addition, Moose Lodge and Jackson are distinguishable on the basis of the relation-
ship of the constitutional right to the entity involved. A finding of state action in Moose
Lodge would have required members of a private club to forfeit their freedom of
association as the price of a liquor license. In Jackson, the consumer was provided with
some procedural safeguards, and a utility company is not in the business of conducting
formal due process hearings. The infringement on the individual's right was slight as
compared to the potential burden of the utility of complying with formal due process
requirements. For an analysis of this balancing of interests, see Note, Public Utilities-
State Action and Informal Due Process After Jackson, 53 N.C.L. REV. 817, 827-28
(1975).
25. Note, Constitutional Law-State Actions-Denial of Abortion by Private Hos-
pital Receiving Federal Financial Support under the Hill-Burton Program does not
Constitute State Action., 2 FoRDoHA URnA L.J. 611, 618-19 (1974).
26. 323 F.2d at 968.
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hospital's performance of a state adopted function brings it within the
holding of Marsh v. Alabama.2 7
Although Simkins dealt with racial discrimination, later Fourth
Circuit holdings demonstrate that the racial context was not the determi-
native factor. Relying on the Simkins analysis of the nature of the Hill-
Burton program, state action has been found in other factual contexts. 28
Although no clear basis exists for treating abortion and sterilization
cases differently, two occurrences in 1973 may prevent the extension of
the Fourth Circuit's state action theory to the abortion-sterilization area.
First, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, despite precedent other-
wise,29 held in Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital 0 that the receipt of Hill-
Burton funds is not a sufficient basis for a finding of state action
because the receipt of governmental funding does not establish that the
state was directly or indirectly involved in the hopsital's decision not to
offer such procedures-a position that other courts have since adopt-
ed.31 Second, Congress enacted the conscience clause of the Health
Programs Extension Act of 197332 forbidding courts to require a Hill-
27. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (corporate town). The Simkins court also cited: Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (primary); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
(primary); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (primary). 393 F.2d at 968 n.15. See
also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876). But see Hudgens v. NLRB, 44 U.S.L.W.
4281 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1976), overruling Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan
Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), which held that a private shopping center was
sufficiently analogous to a business district to be imbued with state action to require that
first amendment rights be recognized on its premises. Whatever the potential effect of
Hudgens on Marsh, the state's participation in the Hill-Burton program still falls within
the holdings of the three Texas primary cases supra and within the sentiments expressed
in Munn, supra.
28. E.g., Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir.
1974) (denial of staff privileges must comply with due process); Sams v. Ohio Valley
Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969) (county residency requirement for staff
privilege eligibility violates due process and equal protection).
29. Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 133 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The
Seventh Circuit may be applying a double standard depending on the presence or absence
of racial discrimination. Note, 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J., supra note 25, at 617. The
author queries what the Seventh Circuit would do if a Hill-Burton hospital serving a
predominantly black community refused to treat sickle cell anemia. Id. at 619.
30. 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973).
31. Abortion-sterlization context: Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513
F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 433 (1975) (abortion); Chrisman v. Sisters of
St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974) (sterilization); Allen v. Sisters of Saint
Joseph, 361 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 490 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1974)
(sterilization). In general: Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Medical Center,
Inc., 507 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th
Cir. 1973); Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 506
F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974). Cf. Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosps. Inc., 487 F.2d 502
(6th Cir. 1973).
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (1974). The part of the Church Amendment relevant to
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Burton hospital to allow abortions or sterilizations if the hospital's
refusal is based on religious or moral grounds.
In Bellir, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals extended the
"specific act theory" of state action to apply to the abortion area. The
specific act theory was developed by the Second Circuit in Powe v.
Miles33 in relation to governmental funding of education. Powe held
that receipt of public funding is not a sufficient basis for a finding of
state action unless the state was involved directly or indirectly in the
specific act challenged. 4 Relying on the Supreme Court's failure in
Doe to invalidate the provision of the Georgia abortion statute that
allows hospitals to refuse to admit abortion patients, the Seventh Circuit
decided that as long as the state is neutral as to whether a Hill-Burton
hospital need offer such procedures, the hospital's decision will be free
of state action.3 5
The reluctance of the courts to find state action in the abortion-
sterilization area possibly reflects a hostility to the Roe and Doe deci-
sions36 and a repugnance to requiring hospitals to offer any particular
service.37  Despite these considerations, finding state action on the basis
of receipt of Hill-Burton funds has merit in the abortion-sterilization
context, as well as in the traditional situations. One purpose of the Hill-
Burton Act is "to assist the several States . . . to furnish adequate
this discussion is section 300a-7(a) (2) (A). For the relevant language, see text accom-
panying note 47 infra.
33. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
34. Id. at 81.
35. 479 F.2d at 760. "We think it is also clear that if a state is completely neutral
on the question whether private hospitals shall perform abortions, the state may
expressly authorize such hospitals to answer that question for themselves." Id. See note
15 supra. For analysis of Bellin's reliance on Doe, see text accompanying notes 44-45
infra.
36. The most striking example of judicial reluctance to find state action in the
abortion-sterilization context is the Fifth Circuit's decision in Greco v. Orange Memorial
Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 433 (1975). The hospital
in Greco, which was exempt from all local, state and federal taxation, was built on land
owned by the county, its construction was financed by interest-bearing county bonds and
Hill-Burton funds, and the building was leased to a private nonprofit corporation for one
dollar a year. The lease included a provision that the lessor county was relieved "'of the
responsibility and expense of operating a hospital."' Id. at 876. The reason for judicial
hostility may be the nature of the Roe decision itself. See Loewy, Abortive Reasons and
Obscene Standards: A Comment on the Abortion and Obscenity Cases, 52 N.C.L. REV.
223, 223-34 (1973).
37. This repugnance is explained in part by corporation law. The decisions made
by a corporation's board of directors are within the board's sound discretion. 1966
WAsm Urnv. L.Q., supra note 11, at 493. However, hospitals should not be governed
by corporation law. See note 11 supra. Cf. Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523
F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975).
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hospital, clinic, or similar services to all their people."3 All hospitals in
the state are taken into account in the allocation of Hill-Burton funds, 9
and the state has the power to preclude the construction of public
hospitals in an entire area by funneling these funds to private hospi-
tals.40  Since the Hill-Burton Act gives the state extensive control over
the types of hospitals available to the public, mere neutrality towards
each hospital's decision is insufficient to insure the exercise of an
individual's fundamental right "free of interference by the State." By
participating in the Hill-Burton program, the state is essentially going
into the business of providing medical care to all its inhabitants. As the
constitutional right involved is peculiarly related to what is now a state
function, this situation is distinguishable from recent United States
Supreme Court cases that define state action narrowly.41
Although Bellin distinguished Simkins on the ground that the
state's duty to require a hospital to comply with the constitutionally
sound nondiscriminatory regulations of the Hill-Burton Act implicated
the state in the hospital's discriminatory policies, 42 this analysis applies
just as well to the abortion-sterilization decisions. The only difference
is that the compulsion comes from the Supreme Court4 rather than
congressional mandate. However, the end result is the same: the hospi-
tal need only comply with the Constitution. In addition, the Bellin
court's reliance on Doe v. Bolton was misplaced. Besides the fact that
the Supreme Court did not expressly pass on the validity of that specific
provision of the Georgia abortion statute,44 the language in Doe shows
at most an intention to protect the denominational hospital. 45  Even if
the Seventh Circuit intended merely to protect the denominational hos-
pital, the effect of the specific act theory is to insulate all private Hill-
Burton hospitals from judicial attack. Protection of the denominational
hospital may be better discussed in connection with the Health Programs
Extension Act of 1973.
The second occurrence threatening the Fourth Circuit's position on
Hill-Burton funding was Congress' enactment of the conscience clause,
38. 42 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1970).
39. Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation
and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 256 (1974).
40. See Note, 4 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, supra note 8, at 88-89.
41. See textual matter in notes 24 and 27 supra.
42. 479 F.2d at 761. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
43. See paragraph containing notes 9-15 supra.
44. The Bellin court recognized this fact. 479 F.2d at 760.
45. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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popularly known as the Church Amendment, of the Health Programs
Extension Act of 1973. This clause in relevant part states: 40
(a) The receipt of .. . [Hill-Burton funds] . . . by any ...
entity does not authorize any court ... to require
(2) such entity to-
(A) make its facilities available for -the performance of
any sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance
of such procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited
by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral con-
victions . . .
The conscience clause was passed in reaction to a preliminary injunction
issued in Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital8 enjoining the defendant
hospital from prohibiting the plaintiff's doctor from sterilizing her dur-
ing the delivery of her baby. In granting the injunction, the court found
receipt of Hill-Burton funds alone sufficient to support the state action
element of jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and 28 U.S.C.
section 1343. 41
As construed by the courts, the Church Amendment forbids a
judicial finding of state action on the basis of receipt of Hill-Burton
funds in the abortion-sterilization context if the hospital's refusal to
perform such procedures is based on religious or moral convictions.50
Concerning the scope of the statute, the United States District Court for
the District of Idaho has noted that" . . . recent congressional action
has effectively revoked the ability of a court to find state action on the
part of a hospital which receives Hill.Burton funds." 1  Although the
broadness of this language indicates that under no circumstances can a
court clothe a Hill-Burton hospital with state action,52 the Ninth Circuit
46. All future references to the Church Amendment apply only to the portion of
the clause quoted.
47. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7(a) (2) (A) (1974).
48. Civil No. 1090 (D. Mont. Nov. 1, 1972). The citation for the later trial of the
section 1983 action is: Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont.
1973), aff'd, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3492 (U.S. Mar. 2,
1976).
49. 1973 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEws 1473.
50. Cases construing the Church Amendment are: Chrisman v. Sisters of St.
Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974); Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F.
Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), ajf'd, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3492 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976); Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp.
799 (D. Idaho 1973), afj'd, 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975).
51. Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Idaho 1973),
a'd, 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975).
52. Note, 4 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. CHANCE, supra note 8, at 93 & n.75.
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gives the statute a much narrower construction, as shown in Chrisman v.
Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace.53 To determine the state action issue in
Chrisman, the court ignored Hill-Burton funding as a relevant factor
and proceeded to analyze other state connections with the defendant
hospital.5 4  The Chrisman interpretation of the statute's mandate is
probably correct.
The trial court in Taylor stated that the Church Amendment was a
valid exercise of congressional power to limit the jurisdiction of the
inferior courts under Article III of the Constitution.55 In Chrisman, the
Ninth Circuit held that the statute did not violate the establishment
clause of the first amendment since Congress' object in passing the
conscience clause was to retain neutrality."0 However, the statute has
yet to be challenged on the basis of legislative encroachment on the
judicial role of interpreting the Constitution.57 In light of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the judicial and legislative roles, a strong
constitutional attack could be made on this basis.
In Reynolds v. Sims, 58 the United States Supreme Court rejected
the argument that congressional approval of a plan that had a detrimen-
tal effect on the constitutional right to vote protected that plan from
judicial scrutiny. The Court stated: "Congress simply lacks the consti-
tutional power to insulate States from attack with respect to alleged
deprivations of individual constitutional rights."59 Therefore, Congress
lacks the power to define state action so as to deprive an individual of a
fundamental constitutional right. The fact that the conscience clause
may be construed as a valid exercise of the congressional power to limit
the jurisdiction of the federal courts is insufficient to protect the clause
from constitutional attack since a statute can be". . . unconstitutional
even though it was adopted by Congress as an exercise of federal
power."0 In Shapiro v. Thompson, 1 the Court noted that "Congress is
53. 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 312.
55. 369 F. Supp. at 951. See Note, 4 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. C-ANGE, supra note
8, at 95-96.
56. 506F.2dat3ll.
57. This challenge was attemeted in Hodgson v. Anderson, but the court found the
plaintiffs did not have standing to make the challenge. 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn.
1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 903 (1975).
58. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
59. Id. at 582.
60. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969).
61. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Shapiro concerned statutory provisions denying welfare
assistance to otherwise qualified recipients because they failed to meet a one year
residency requirement. The Court held the provisions unconstitutional as a violation of
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without power to enlist state cooperation in a joint federal-state program
by legislation which authorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection
clause."6 Although Congress' purpose in enacting the Church Amend-
ment was to afford protection to the denominational hospital, the vehicle
chosen has the effect of allowing the state to reap the benefits of the Hill-
Burton program while at -the same time denying the fundamental rights
of individuals by channeling funds to denominational hospitals.03
The conflict remains between the fundamental right recognized in
Roe and the desire to protect denominational hospitals recognized in
Doe. Although the Church Amendment was an attempt by Congress to
give the dictum in Doe statutory significance, statutory restraints on
judicial interpretation of the Constitution are not within Congress' pow-
er.64 However, a crucial question remains: does the denominational
hospital need protection? A finding of state action does not automati-
cally compel the hospital to offer abortions or sterilizations. The hospi-
tal may only be compelled if the individual does not have access to a
facility willing to allow the performance of these procedures. In the few
cases when the state refuses to furnish a clinic for these purposes and the
denominational hospital is the only facility available, the infringement
on the entity's religious or moral convictions is slight since the staff and
doctors involved in the performance of abortions and sterilizations must
not have any religious or moral objections to the procedures.05 As the
hospital need only provide its physical facilities for the performance of
such procedures, its interest should be subordinated to an individual's
fundamental rights. 6 Until the Supreme Court sees fit to clarify the
hospital's role in the abortion-sterilization area, the Fourth Circuit
should follow its own sound precedent when faced with this problem.
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the right to travel even though it assumed arguendo that Congress had approved the
statutes. Id. at 641.
62. Id. The Court relied on Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10
(1966).
63. See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
65. See Ambrose, The Milwaukee Story: A Public Hospital's Resistance to the
Supreme Court Abortion Rulings, 4 FAM. PLAN./PoP. R P. 68, 69 (1975). Cf. 42
U.S.C.A. § 300a-7(c) (1974).
66. Compare Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. at 803 with Note, 74
CoLTJM. L. REv., supra note 39, at 257-58, 261 for analysis of whether a hospital has a
first amendment right of freedom of religion.
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